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Non technical summary 
 
One important argument in the political debate on dismissal protection is that firing 
costs reduce the re-employment probabilities of the unemployed, and especially for 
those with adverse signals such as long-term unemployment or low qualification. 
Since the mid-1980s it is relatively easy possible for employers to hire workers on 
fixed-term contracts (FTC) in order to avoid costs due to dismissals. Thus FTCs or 
temporary work in general may increase the employment opportunities of (long-) term 
unemployed which are harmed by the firing costs due to the employment protection 
for permanent workers. The rationale is simple: employers may be more willing to hire 
if they can fire easily.   
 
The paper investigates whether (unsubsidised) fixed-term contracts (FTCs) are a 
means of integration or a so-called ‘stepping stone’ for the unemployed towards 
(permanent) employment relationships. This is done by analysing whether entering 
into an FTC improves the employment opportunities of an unemployed person in 
terms of the probability of subsequent permanent contracts and subsequent periods of 
employment and unemployment and periods out-of-labour-force.  
 
The empirical analysis is based on propensity score matching methods, obtaining the 
effects of FTCs by comparing the future situation of (‘treated’) unemployed entering 
into FTCs after a particular duration of unemployment with a suitable control group of 
individuals who do not so (‘non-treated’). The data set used is the German Socio 
Economic Panel for West Germany for the period 1991 until 2001. First, it is discussed 
that there are at least two reasonable counterfactuals for individuals entering into FTC 
jobs after a certain number of months in unemployment. One counterfactual, most 
commonly applied in evaluation studies, is to compare a ‘world with FTCs’ with a 
‘world without FTCs’ and define non-treated persons as unemployed who never 
(during the period covered by the data set) enter into FTCs. A second counterfactual 
which may be more in line with the idea of sequential job search (unemployed enter 
into FTCs after having failed to find a permanent job) is not to take up an FTC job up 
to a certain unemployment duration, but possibly in a later month. This implies a 
comparison of unemployed entering into FTCs in a certain month of unemployment 
with those unemployed who do not enter into FTCs up to the end of that month but 
possibly in a later month. Both definitions are analysed in the paper.  
 
The hazard rate analysis shows that typical characteristics which have in other studies 
been found to prolong unemployment duration such as disabilities, being a foreigner, 
or being female and having children do not affect the FTC hazard rate, but have a 
negative effect on the permanent contract hazard rate. Thus FTCs may be “entry jobs” 
for unemployed with low employment chances. Entering into FTCs increases the 
future employment probability (including FTC and permanent contract jobs) and the 
probability of holding permanent jobs and decreases the probability of being out-of-
labour-force. These findings are compatible with the hypothesis that FTCs may be 
stepping-stones towards permanent employment relationships. However, some results 
of the hazard rate model and the matching estimator are in line with dual labour 
market theories. Having held an FTC in the past increases the probability of holding an 
FTC in the future. Furthermore, entering into an FTC does not reduce the risk of being 
unemployed in the long-run, as the effect vanishes 18 months after the transition to the 
FTC. Consequently, the positive employment effect is not accompanied by a lower 
probability of registered unemployment but by a reduced probability of being-out-of 
labour-force.  
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Abstract 
The paper investigates whether (unsubsidised) fixed-term contracts (FTCs) are a 
means of integration for the unemployed in the West German labour market. This is 
done by analysing whether entering into an FTC improves the employment opportuni-
ties of an unemployed person in terms of the probability of subsequent permanent 
contracts and subsequent periods of employment and unemployment. The empirical 
analysis is based on propensity score matching methods, obtaining the effects of FTCs 
by comparing the future situation of (‘treated’) unemployed entering into FTCs after a 
particular unemployment duration with a suitable control group of ‘non-treated’ indi-
viduals. In principal different counterfactual situations for treated persons entering 
into FTCs after a certain number of month of unemployment are reasonable. A first 
counterfactual is never to enter into an FTC. A second counterfactual is not to take up 
an FTC job in this month but possibly in a later month. These two possible counter-
factuals imply different definitions for the group of non-treated individuals and im-
pose different policy questions. Both definitions are analysed in the paper. The pro-
pensity score is estimated by a discrete hazard rate model, which seems to be an ap-
propriate way of taking into account the potential endogenous effect of the unem-
ployment duration on the selection into the type of contract. Further insights are 
gained by comparing the determinants of the transition to FTC and permanent con-
tract jobs. There is some evidence that FTCs may serve as ‘stepping stones’ towards 
permanent employment for the unemployed. However, the hypothesis that FTCs lead 
to dual labour markets cannot be rejected.  
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1 Introduction 
One important argument in the political debate on dismissal protection is that firing costs 
reduce the re-employment probabilities of the unemployed, especially for those with adverse 
signals such as long-term unemployment or low qualification. Since the mid-1980s it is rela-
tively easy for employers to hire workers on fixed-term contracts (FTC) in order to avoid 
dismissal costs.1 Thus FTCs, or temporary work in general, may increase the employment 
opportunities of the (long-term) unemployed which are harmed by the firing costs due to 
employment protection for permanent workers. The rationale is simple: employers may be 
more willing to hire if they can fire easily.   
However, objections are raised to this view. Temporary work may create a segmented la-
bour market where the employment stability of permanent contract workers is raised by 
firms’ using temporary workers as a kind of buffer against transitory changes in the business 
environment (see SAINT-PAUL, 1996). This may imply for specific groups of workers that 
they are ‘trapped’ in a cycle of recurrent periods of unemployment and temporary work. The 
temporary nature of the employment relationship becomes the cause of subsequent unem-
ployment and temporary work (see TAUBMAN and WACHTER, 1986). This phenomenon may 
be fostered by inferior access to training and lower promotion prospects in temporary jobs 
(see BOOTH, FRANCESCONI and FRANK, 2002a). Thus the central issue is whether or not tem-
porary work really increases the long-run employment prospects of the unemployed entering 
into temporary work in terms of future permanent employment relationships or employment 
in general. In other words: Should unemployed job searchers take up FTC jobs or should 
they keep on searching for permanent positions? Are FTC jobs ‘stepping stones’ towards 
permanent jobs? 
 There are only few studies currently available trying to identify the causal effects of FTC 
on future employment opportunities. On the one hand, there are studies evaluating the em-
ployment effects of subsidised temporary employment relationships which are promoted by 
public employment offices (see LECHNER et al. 2001; GERFIN, LECHNER and STEIGER, 2002). 
On the other hand, there are studies analysing the determinants of the duration of (unsubsi-
dised2) temporary employment relationships and the determinants of the transition to other 
labour market states (see, for example, ALBA-RAMÌREZ, 1998; GÜELL and PETRONGOLO, 
2003; PEETERS, 2000; GIESECKE and GROß, 2002). Although the latter studies may shed light 
on the determinats of “successful” temporary employment relationships (in terms of transi-
tion to permanent contract jobs or the duration of the temporary job), they are not informa-
                                              
1  FTCs define temporary employment relationships, which expire automatically without dismissal at the end 
of the agreed term. After the expiration of the contract the employment relationship is terminated, or the 
employer can decide to offer the worker a permanent position or, under certain circumstances, another 
FTC. FTCs have become important in many European Countries since the mid of 1980s (see for example 
the Special Issue of the Economic Journal in June 2002). A detailed description of the institutional back-
ground in Germany can be found in SCHÖMANN, ROGOWSKI and KRUPPE (1995) as well as BOOCKMANN 
and HAGEN (2001). 
2  Here unsubsidised means that the temporary jobs are not active labour market programmes in the sense that 
they are sponsored by the public employment office.    
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tive with regard to the question whether it is beneficial for an unemployed person (in terms 
of the subsequent employment probability) to take up a temporary job. 
To the best of my knowledge there are only two studies which analyse the causal effects of 
unsubsidised temporary jobs on future employment opportunities. The study by BRODATY, 
CRÉPON and FOUGÈRE (2001) compares the employment effects of youth employment pro-
grammes with FTCs in France by matching estimators. It turns out that FTC jobs are more 
effective than the employment programmes. There is, however, no comparison to unem-
ployed who do not participate in any programme and who do not enter into FTCs, respec-
tively. Second, VAN DEN BERG, HOLM and VAN OURS (2002) analyse a special kind of tem-
porary job scheme in the Netherlands which is open for medical students searching for 
trainee positions to get work experience. The question is whether these temporary jobs help 
students to get a position as a trainee, i.e. whether the temporary job is a stepping-stone to-
wards the trainee position compared to the situation in which the students do not take up the 
temporary job. In order to deal with the selection problem, all possible transitions between 
the three states (searching, temporary job and trainee position) are simultaneously estimated 
in a multivariate duration model. It is found that the temporary job helps to get a trainee po-
sition. The authors explain the positive effect by positive signals for potential employers.  
This paper attempts to investigate the employment effects of FTCs for the unemployed by 
using matching methods which have been developed in the econometrics of evaluation of 
active labour market programes (see HECKMAN, LALONDE and SMITH, 1999 for a survey). 
Matching estimators are based on the “potential outcome approach” to causality (ROY, 1951; 
RUBIN, 1974), i.e. the hypothetical (and, therefore, unobservable) future outcome of a treated 
person in a “non-treated state” is estimated by a control group of non-treated persons. The 
methodological contribution of the paper is to estimate the propensity score by a discrete 
hazard rate model, which has been done only rarely so far.3 It will be argued that this may 
have some advantages – at least in this application.  
                                              
3  To the best of my knowledge there are only two papers available which use hazard rate models for the 
estimation of the propensity score (see BRODATY, CRÉPON and FOUGÈRE, 2001 and SIANESI, 2001a). Re-
cently this approach has been formalized by FREDRIKSSON and JOHANSSON (2003).  
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2 Theoretical Considerations 
Workers entering into FTC jobs face higher unemployment and income risks than workers 
entering into permanent contract jobs. Descriptive statistics on the duration of employment 
spells after the transition from unemployment to FTCs or permanent contracts, respectively, 
which are in line with this statement, can be found in Table A1 in the Appendix. Available 
empirical studies suggest, furthermore, that FTC workers do not receive wage premiums to 
compensate for these risks, but even contemporaneously lower wages (see, for example, 
HAGEN, 2002). These empirical results do not conflict with economic theory. For example, 
in the dual labour market model by REBITZER and TAYLOR (1991) wages for temporary 
workers may be lower, even if temporary and permanent workers are perfect substitutes. 
Furthermore, one can argue that temporary employment relationships are associated with a 
loss of returns to job seniority.4   
 
Under which conditions do job searcher enter into FTC jobs? 5 
In order to answer this question one can argue in the framework of job search theory. The 
probability that an unemployed worker i leaves unemployment to a specific job after a cer-
tain unemployment duration t (hazard rate)  is equal to the probability of receiving a 
specific job offer6 
( )ih t
iξ  times the probability that the offer is acceptable ( )( )( )1 Ri iF w t− , 
where  ( )( Ri i )F w t  is the cumulated wage offer distribution and  is the reservation 
wage (see MORTENSEN 1986: 862). How can job search theory be applied to the case that 
there are FTC and permanent contract job offers?    
( )Riw t
BURDETT and MORTENSEN (1980) augment the standard sequential job search model with a 
job-specific random dismissal probability, without taking FTCs and permanent contracts 
explicitly into account. If one assumes that failing to get the contract renewed is associated 
with an adverse signal for potential future employers (for example, if non-renewal due to 
unfavourable business development or due to bad worker’s performance is not distinguish-
able) then the reservation wage is increasing with the dismissal probability.7 Therefore, the 
                                              
4  A result often found in wage regressions is that job seniority has a significantly positive effect on wages. 
This is interpreted as accumulation of firm specific human capital during employment. Based on empirical 
evidence PISSARIDES (1994: 458) concludes: “Thus although quitters generally benefit from a job change, 
those who are separated because of an exogenous shock and find a new job after an unemployment spell 
generally suffer.” BOOTH, FRANCESCONI and FRANK (2002a) find that men having had an FTC employ-
ment spell ten years earlier suffer a 5% wage penalty compared to workers who have always worked on a 
permanent contract in the U.K. For women there is no comparable long-term wage penalty.   
5  Firms’ reasons for employing temporary workers are analysed in BOOCKMANN and HAGEN (2001).   
6  This arrival rate of job offers in standard search models can be decomposed further into the flow of vacan-
cies times the probability that the worker becomes aware of the vacancy times the probability that the 
worker actually is offered the job.   
7  Burdett and Mortensen’s general proposition is that the reservation wage is increasing in the dismissal 
probability, if the return to search after being dismissed is less than the expected return to search before a 
job was found. 
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reservation wage with regard to FTC jobs is ceteris paribus higher than the reservation wage 
with regard to permanent contract jobs (see GROOT, 1990; BOVER and GÓMEZ, 2003). The 
reservation wage with regard to FTC jobs decreases, however, with the expected probability 
that the contract is transformed into a permanent one by the employer. Nevertheless, the ac-
ceptability of FTC job offers is ceteris paribus lower than the acceptability of permanent 
contract job offers, given that the latter are more stable.   
 There are various reasons to assume the reservation wage to be decreasing in unemploy-
ment duration, for example, due to ageing within a finite time horizon model (see FRANZ, 
2003: 213). Therefore, the probability that an FTC job is acceptable increases with unem-
ployment duration. There may be further reasons for job searchers to reduce their reservation 
wages and accept FTC job offers. They may, for example, have to meet temporary declines 
in family income, particularly when other family members have also been dismissed.  
Unemployment compensation is interpreted within the job search framework as a reduction 
of the opportunity costs of unemployment (see MORTENSEN, 1986). By increasing the reser-
vation wage it reduces the acceptability of job offers. Given the assumptions about the reser-
vation wages with regard to FTCs and permanent contracts, the probability of accepting an 
FTC job offer is reduced more than the probability of accepting a permanent contract job 
offer (see BOVER and GÓMEZ, 2003). In other words: Unemployed without unemployment 
compensation are more willing to accept FTCs, given a certain probability of permanent con-
tract job offers, than unemployed receiving unemployment compensation.8 This result can 
also be derived, outside the framework of search theory, from the model by VAN DE KLUN-
DERT (1990). In the model, unemployment results from the assumption that queuing for a 
‘primary’ job is preferred to a ‘secondary’ job if the utility derived from unemployment 
compensation, combined with the status of searching for a proper, that is, primary job, ex-
ceeds the utility derived from a secondary job. Besides the effects of subjective factors such 
as “status in the labour market” the model highlights the effects of unemployment compen-
sation: If the amount is relatively high and depends on the previous wage rate, unemployed 
persons may prefer to wait for a suitable primary job. Hence, previous high-wage, “high 
status”, primary (permanent) jobs increase unemployment duration and decrease the prob-
ability of entering into low-wage, “low status”, secondary (temporary) jobs. Since in particu-
lar entrants into the labour market (younger workers or women after maternity leave) are 
often not entitled to unemployment compensation and have no determined idea about their 
“labour market status”, they are more likely to enter into FTCs. Unemployed who have pre-
viously been employed under a permanent contract will hesitate to accept an FTC job offer. 
This may lead to various types of state dependence.     
Additional explanations are possible if one assumes incomplete information with respect to  
job searchers’ characteristics. For example, the searchers’ abilities are only incompletely 
observable for potential employers.9 Temporary contracts may be a kind of prolonged proba-
tionary period which allows firms to obtain information that is unavailable before hiring and 
                                              
8  According to this argumentation, unemployment compensation could be interpreted as an subsidy for the 
search for ‘good’ (permanent) jobs.  
9  SPENCE (1973) formulated ‘hiring as investment under uncertainty’.   
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that serves as a check on the quality of the match between worker and job (screening).10 
Obviously, screening becomes even more important if institutions (dismissal protection) 
generate additional firing-costs.  
A somewhat surprising result is generated by the model of LOH (1994), which is based on 
self-selection due to incomplete information and probationary periods. Loh’s model predicts 
that in a competitive market setting, workers with greater ability – given other observable 
characteristics such as age, qualification and gender – migrate to firms offering jobs with 
probationary period, and those with lower ability migrate to firms offering jobs with no 
probationary period, since the former face lower risks of losing their jobs. Lower wages 
during the probationary period are compensated disproportionately after the probationary 
period. Again, if one interprets FTCs (at the start of a career path within a firm) as a kind of 
probationary period, the model predicts that, given the observable characteristics, high-
ability job searchers enter into FTCs whereas low-ability job searchers enter into permanent 
contracts or keep on searching for permanent jobs, respectively.   
                                             
If incomplete information plays an important role, job searchers’ employment histories 
may serve as signals. References from previous employers and the reputation of previous 
employers may reveal information on the unobservable characteristics of the worker. If the 
previous employment history involves adverse signals, employers with permanent contract 
vacancies will hesitate to offer these job-searchers permanent jobs (see PEETERS, 1999). If, 
for example, unemployment duration is an adverse signal11 then, within the job search 
framework, the offer rate for permanent contract jobs may decrease relative to the offer rate 
for FTC jobs with increasing unemployment duration. Given that the relative FTC job offer 
rate and the acceptability of FTC offers increase with unemployment duration, the duration 
dependence of the FTC hazard rate should be empirically more positive than the duration 
dependence of the permanent contract hazard rate (see GROOT, 1990).12 
Dual labour market theories predict that the temporary nature of an employment relation-
ship is the cause of subsequent unemployment and temporary jobs (see TAUBMANN and WA-
CHTER, 1986). Thus, interpreting FTC jobs as ‘secondary’ and permanent contract jobs as 
‘primary’ implies that having been employed with an FTC in the past may be an adverse 
signal for future employers, at least if the jobs were associated with unfavourable attrib-
utes.13 This statement is also compatible with theoretical models on signalling effects (see 
MA and WEISS, 1993; MCCORMICK, 1990). Hence, workers who previously held an FTC 
job, have a higher probability of re-entering into an FTC job, since they receive fewer per-
manent contract job offers.   
 
10  This argument is in line with the concept of matches as “experience goods” (see JOVANOVIC, 1979: 973): 
“…the only way to determine the quality of a specific match is to form the match and ‘experience it’.”  
11  LOCKWOOD (1991) shows in a theoretical model that when it is costly for employers to test workers they 
may use unemployment duration as a signal on which the employment decision is based.  
12  If the individual hazard rate depends (after controlling for observed and unobserved heterogeneity) on 
unemployment duration then this is called (true) duration dependence. Negative (positive) duration de-
pendence means that the hazard rate decreases (increases) with unemployment duration. 
13  “...secondary employment may be regarded as a kind of stigma that bars access to the primary sector.” 
(MCDONALD and SOLOW, 1985: 1124). 
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A further explanation besides dual labour market theories is that the drawback of the tem-
porary nature of the jobs is compensated by other features of the jobs which correspond to 
the job searchers’ preferences. For example, flexible schedules or part-time jobs in order to 
meet family, school or other non-work responsibilities may be only available with FTCs or 
there are scarce permanent contract job offers with these features (in the local labour market 
concerned), respectively. This would imply that women with children enter into FTCs with a 
higher probability. 
So far, the possibility of on-the-job search has been neglected. It is, however, likely that 
FTCs promote on-the-job search in comparison to permanent contract jobs, since rational 
workers will anticipate the higher risk of job losses (see BOERI, 1999). As FTC workers 
would, therefore, start earlier searching for a (permanent contract) job, FTCs may be inter-
preted as notice period (see BOERI, 1999; SWAIM and PODGURSKY, 1990). If one further as-
sumes that FTCs increase the arrival rate of job offers (due to networking etc., see next sub-
section) and/or improves the wage offer distribution by enhancing human capital (see next 
subsection), entering into an FTC job may be an optimal search strategy.14 On-the-job 
search may also render re-entering into FTCs after a previous FTC and a subsequent unem-
ployment spell as an optimal strategy. Whether entering into an FTC job is a rationale strat-
egy for job searchers depends on whether FTCs really improve the parameters mentioned 
above.  
 
Why should FTCs be stepping stones towards permanent positions? 
As argued by BOERI (1999) within a matching model with on-the-job search, temporary jobs 
may be interpreted as intermediate and transitory labour market status between employment 
and unemployment. If so, the question arises, why and under which conditions FTCs may be 
stepping stones towards permanent positions, that is, increase the long-term employment 
opportunities of those entering into FTCs.  
First, during FTC jobs there will be more investments in (general and specific) human 
capital (in comparison to the situation in which the person had stayed unemployed), even if 
there is no formal training. This may raise the employment opportunities at the same or other 
employers. The latter may be explained by an induced shift in the wage offer distribution. 
However, firms will invest less in FTC workers than in permanent contract workers, since 
they recognize the shorter expected job tenure (see BOOTH, FRANCESCONI and FRANK, 
2002b). Therefore, the opposite effect may also be possible: If the unemployed person had 
not accepted the FTC job offer in a certain period, she or he might have got a permanent 
contract job offer in the next period with better training opportunities and career prospects. 
As mentioned above, FTCs may be used as a prolonged probationary period in order to 
overcome the problem of asymmetric information. Thus FTCs may serve as a screening de-
vice. This may help unemployed persons with adverse signals, who would otherwise get 
permanent contract job offers only with a low probability (see PEETERS, 1999). After the 
                                              
14  The argument is based on HECKMAN, LALONDE and SMITH (1999), who present a model which interprets 
public sponsored labour market training as an optimal form of job search.  
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expiration of the FTC and after sufficient information on the worker’s productivity is col-
lected, the worker may get a permanent contract job offer from the same employer. This may 
be especially true if FTCs induce a sorting mechanism like in the model of LOH (1994) de-
scribed above. Given identical observable characteristics, workers with (unobservable) ‘high 
ability’ select themselves into FTCs and get their contract transformed into a permanent con-
tract with higher wages afterwards.     
As mentioned above, if FTC jobs are associated with reduced employment stability, ra-
tional workers will already anticipate the higher risk of job losses and will, therefore, start 
searching for a (permanent contract) job earlier. In other words: temporary jobs may promote 
on-the-job search (see BOERI, 1999). So it seems to be plausible to state that the job search 
intensity may not be lower than during unemployment and strictly higher than in permanent 
contract jobs. If, however, search intensity is lower than during unemployment, FTCs may 
also decrease the probability of permanent contract job offers compared to unemployment. 
Furthermore, FTC workers may be in the position to enlarge their social network within the 
firm or even the industry in which they are employed (see VAN DEN BERG, HOLM and VAN 
OURS, 2002). This may increase the workers’ knowledge of (future) vacancies and may 
again help other employers to collect (otherwise unobserved) information on the workers’ 
productivity.   
For on-the-job-searchers an FTC job may also be a positive signal to other employers, 
again, in comparison to the situation in which the person had stayed unemployed and thus 
had possibly been affected by negative ‘stigma effects’ due to unemployment. However, in 
order to be a credible positive signal, temporary jobs must be more costly to be found (in 
broad terms of search costs) for low ability workers (see GERFIN, LECHNER and STEIGER, 
2002). The harder it is to get a temporary job the better is the signal for potential future em-
ployers. But again, entering into an FTC job may have the opposite effect, that is, it may also 
serve as a signal that the person had not received any offers for permanent contract jobs. 
Hence, temporary jobs may be ‘stigmatized’ (see MA and WEISS, 1993). Given that FTCs are 
associated with a negative wage differential it may be an adverse signal especially for highly 
qualified workers (see MCCORMICK, 1990).  
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3 Estimation Methods 
What effect do FTCs have on employment opportunities of the unemployed? This question 
can be restated: How do the employment opportunities of unemployed persons change due to 
the fact they enter into FTCs instead of keeping on searching?  In order to answer this ques-
tion, one can apply methods which are used for the evaluation of active labour market policy 
(ALMP).15  
First of all, a careful definition of the ‘policy measure’ or ‘intervention’ that should be ac-
tually evaluated is necessary. In other words: what is the ‘treatment’?16 In the following 
“treatment” is defined as transition from unemployment in an FTC job. Further attributes of 
the FTC job, such as the duration of the contract, the wage, or the working conditions, are 
not taken into account, i.e. many very heterogeneous jobs are pooled together into one ‘treat-
ment’.17    
3.1 The Evaluation Problem and its Solution in General 
Evaluation problem and the parameter of interest 
What is the causal effect of a treatment 1 (take up an FTC), relative to another treatment 0 or 
non-treatment, respectively (stay unemployed), on an outcome variable (future employment 
status) Y ?  
Let Y1 be the outcome (future employment probability in a permanent contract) that would 
result if the individual was exposed to treatment 1 (FTC) and Y0 the outcome that would re-
sult if the same individual received no treatment (stayed unemployed).18 { }0,1C ∈  is a 
dummy variable indicating if the treatment is actually received (C=1).  
For an individual i, the actually observed employment probability is . 
However, the individual causal effect  cannot be estimated, since an individual can 
never be observed in two different states  at the same point in time. To put it another 
( )010 iiiii yycyy −+=
01
ii yy −( 01 , ii yy )
                                              
15  For a survey see HECKMAN, LALONDE and SMITH (1999); BLUNDELL and COSTAS DIAS (2000); ANGRIST 
and KRUEGER (1999). 
16  Following the literature, the terms “treatment” and “participation” are used interchangeably throughout this 
paper.  
17  Note, however, that focusing on previously unemployed individuals reduces the heterogeneity in compari-
son to other studies dealing with the effects of FTCs. Furthermore, also in studies which evaluate different 
labour market programmes it is usual to pool at least some measures, since it is, for example, in case of 
training programmes impossible to interpret every type and topic of training as a separate ‘treatment’. 
Within an extension of the used methodological framework it would be possible to differentiate between 
different types of FTC jobs, for example between jobs with long and short FTCs or jobs with low or high 
skills requirement (see LECHNER, 2001b for the foundation of the so-called ‘multiple-treatments’ ap-
proach). The scale of the dataset is, however, too small for the identification of multiple treatments.    
18  In the following, upper case letters denote random variables and lower case letters denote specific values of 
those variables. Furthermore, the subscript for the time dimension is omitted in order to keep notation sim-
ple.   
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way, the counterfactuals  as well as (  are not observable. While estima-
tion of the causal effect for an individual is never possible, it is possible for the mean (or 
other quantities) in samples of the population (see LECHNER, 1999). 
( 0,1 =ii cy ) )1,0 =ii cy
The parameter of interest in most evaluation studies is the average effect of the treatment 
on the treated,  
                    
( ) ( ) ( )1 0 1 01 1TT E Y Y C E Y C E Y C= − = = = − =1 ,           (1) 
which is the average effect for those who actually receive the treatment. In the application in 
this paper, the TT  defined in equation (1) measures the change in the future employment 
prospects of unemployed entering into FTCs which is caused by the fact that they actually 
entered into FTCs ( =1). The last term in (1) describes the hypothetical average employ-
ment probability if the FTC workers had stayed unemployed. Of course, this term is not ob-
servable and has to be estimated using a control group of unemployed workers. However, the 
average future employment probability of unemployed workers is typically not suitable since 
unemployed entering into FTCs and unemployed who do not enter into FTCs differ in char-
acteristics which affect the future employment probability, 
C
 
   ( ) ( )0 01 0E Y C E Y C= ≠ = .                     (2) 
Equation (2) states that using the future employment probability of unemployed individuals 
as an estimate for the hypothetical situation in which an FTC worker stayed unemployed is 
in general not valid, since both groups differ due to observable and unobservable characteris-
tics giving rise to a selection bias: the workers entering into FTCs are not a random sample 
of the population, but they may select themselves or may be selected on the basis of charac-
teristics, which also influence their outcome (i.e. their future employment prospects).19  
 
Statistical matching  
Let X be a vector of variables that are unaffected by the treatment, such as gender, age and 
qualification. The statistical matching estimator may solve the problem of selection bias (due 
to differences in observable characteristics) by imposing the Conditional Independence As-
sumption (CIA) 
 
     0Y C X⊥              (3) 
 
where  denotes independence.20 The assumption states that the outcomes of the non-
treated individuals are independent of the participation status C, once one controls for ob-
servable variables X (see BLUNDELL  and COSTAS DIAS, 2000).  
⊥
                                              
19  Using ( 0 0i iE Y C = ) as an estimate for ( 0 1i iE Y C = )  is occasionally termed “naïve control group”. 
20  The CIA is also termed ‘ignorability of treatment’ or ‘selection on observables’. Basic statistical matching 
estimators solve the problem of selection bias if and only if the selection bias is completely determined by 
selection on the observable variables X. So if one applies the method of matching one has either to assume 
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The CIA justifies the use of matched non-treated persons (unemployed) to measure which 
future employment opportunities treated (workers entering into FTCs) would have, on aver-
age, if they had not participated (had stayed unemployed in order to keep on searching). Ob-
viously, the vector X should contain all the variables that are thought to simultaneously in-
fluence participation and outcome. If this condition is fulfilled, one can assume  
 
  ( ) (0 01, 0, )E Y C X E Y C X= = = .      (4) 
 
By using this expression it is possible to estimate the TT  expressed in equation (1) consis-
tently.  
A fundamental requirement for the validity of most microeconometric studies is the stable 
unit-treatment value assumption (SUTVA; see RUBIN, 1980): there is no interference between 
units (persons) leading to different outcomes depending on treatments other units received, 
that is, the treatment and non-treatment outcomes as well as the treatment effects are not 
affected by who is treated or how many individuals are treated.21 In context of the evaluation 
of ALMP these effects on the non-participants are called indirect effects of the treatment (see 
HECKMAN, LALONDE and SMITH, 1999). If the SUTVA is violated the causal effect estimated 
by the partial analysis at the microeconomic level is not informative with regard to the im-
pact on the economy at large. What does this assumption mean for the analyses at hand? The 
fact that some individuals enter into FTCs must not affect the labour market situation of 
those individuals who do not so. For example, if entering into FTCs increases the individu-
als’ labour market chances this should not be at the expense of those who do not enter into 
FTCs. It is, however, conceivable that a positive effect for participants estimated at the mi-
croeconomic level is based solely on redistribution of employment chances between treated 
and non-treated individuals. Furthermore, the whole range of possibilities how permanent 
contract jobs are substituted by temporary jobs and the impacts on wage formation and pro-
ductivity are not taken into account. Obviously, the SUTVA is very likely to be violated in 
reality, a statement which is also predicted by theoretical models explaining the macroeco-
nomic impact of FTCs, such as BOERI (1999) or BLANCHARD and LANDIER (2002). Never-
theless, in line with previous literature, the microeconometric analysis is regarded here as a 
complementary starting-point for further analyses using other (macroeconomic or general 
equilibrium) methods.  
A further necessary assumption is that the possible phenomenon of perfect predictability of 
the participation status C given X is ruled out. This is done by assuming that 
( )0 Pr 1 1C X< = <
                                                                                                                                           
, which guarantees that persons with the same X values have a positive 
probability of being both participants and non-participants, i.e. any individual constitutes a 
possible participant and possible non-participant (see HECKMAN, LALONDE and SMITH, 1999: 
that there is no selection on unobservables or that by conditioning on X also mean differences in unobserv-
ables are balanced. 
21  If the SUTVA is violated the “no-treatment” benchmark is contaminated by treatment (see HECKMAN, 
LALONDE and SMITH, 1999: 2035).  
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1920). Every individual entering into an FTC could in general also stay unemployed in order 
to keep on searching and vice versa.  
Particularly if the vector X is large and contains many continuous variables, it may be quite 
unlikely that a match between all people of the treatment and non-treatment groups will be 
found for every combination of X (‘curse of dimensionality’; HECKMAN, ICHIMURA and 
TODD, 1997). However, as ROSENBAUM and RUBIN (1983) show, it is sufficient to match 
treated and non-treated persons on the conditional probability of participation given the vec-
tor of observed characteristics. This conditional probability of participation  
( ) (Pr 1e X C X≡ = )  is called the propensity score. By definition, treatment and non-
treatment observations with the same value of the propensity score have the same distribu-
tion of the full vector of X. So (4) can be rewritten as 
   
  ( )( ) ( )( )0 01, 0,E Y C e X E Y C e X= = = .                    (5) 
 
Equation (5) allows to reduce the high-dimensional vector X to a one-dimensional probabili-
ty  and eases the problem of finding appropriate matches. The propensity score  
can be estimated by standard parametric approaches like the probit or logit model (see DE-
HEJIA and WAHBA, 1999). Following the literature, the predicted linear index rather than the 
predicted conditional probability is used (see LECHNER, 1998). The reason is that individuals 
in the tails of the distribution can be distinguished more exactly.  Nevertheless, in the follow-
ing the term propensity score is also used for the linear index.   
( )e X ( )e X
In concrete terms the matching estimator works as follows: For each person i in the group 
of unemployed entering into FTCs, a (group of) comparable unemployed person(s) has to be 
found. Matches are constructed on the basis of a neighbourhood , where  is the es-
timated propensity score for treated person i. Let 
( )ie ie
0N  denote the number of observations in 
the sample of unemployed and  is the number of observations in the sample of unem-
ployed entering into FTCs. Thus, the persons in the unemployed sample who are neighbours 
to i, are individuals 
1N
{ }0j C∈ =  for whom , i.e. the set of persons ( )je ∈ ie
( ){ }i jA j e e= ∈ i .  
The effect of the treatment (FTC) for each observation i in the FTC workers group is esti-
mated by subtracting the weighted average of the outcome of the unemployed workers group 
observations from the outcome of the treatment observation i (see HECKMAN, LALONDE and 
SMITH, 1999). Hence the TT is estimated by  
 












  .                   (6) 
 
Different matching estimators differ in the weights  with  for the 
members of the comparison group.  











Nearest-neighbour matching (NN-matching) defines the neighbourhood  of the individual 
i entering into an FTC in such a way that only the unemployed j is selected as a control that 




   { }{ }01,..., mini ij NA j e e∈= − j ,                  (7) 
 
where  is a metric measuring the distance between  and . Equation (7) states that the 
unemployed worker j with the value of  that is nearest to  is selected as a match and is 
defined as a control for the FTC worker i. This selected unemployed worker is attached with 
the weight =1, i.e. there is only one control per treated individual.   
ie je
je ie
( ,w i j)
NN-matching can be performed with or without replacement. With replacement means that 
the non-treated individuals can be used more than once. This can improve the matching qual-
ity, but it increases the related standard error of the estimated effect. Therefore, the standard 
errors have to be adjusted (for the calculation of the standard errors see subsection 3.3). In 
order to reduce the risk of ‘bad matches’, a modified version of NN-matching called ‘caliper 
matching’ is used (see COCHRAN and RUBIN, 1973). For a pre-specified level of tolerance 
, the FTC worker i is matched to the unemployed worker j so that: 0Ψ >
 
 i je eΨ > − .                         (8) 
 
If none of the unemployed persons is within the interval  around the treated individual i, 
the individual i is left unmatched and is not used for the estimation. This is one possible 





Simple NN-matching uses only a fraction of the information on the non-treated individuals 
since only one non-treated person is matched to one treated person. Therefore, it is associ-
ated with a loss of efficiency (see SIANESI, 2001a; FRÖLICH, 2001). Kernel-based matching 
estimators construct matches by calculating weighted averages of the outcomes of all indi-
viduals in the non-treated sample with the weights depending on the similarity of the non-
treated persons in terms of distance between  and . Thus the variance of the estimate is 
reduced (efficiency gain), which may, however, be associated with an increased bias (imbal-
ance in observable characteristics). Therefore, there is in general a trade-off between the 
minimising of bias and minimising of variance (see the discussion SIANESI, 2001a: 27). As 
discussed in detail by BERGEMANN, FITZENBERGER and SPECKESSER (2001) as well as 
FRÖLICH (2001) the non-treated outcome of the treated individuals 
ie je
( )0 1,E Y C X=  can be 
estimated using a nonparametric kernel regression as a weighted outcome of all non-treated 
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individuals. Kernel-based matching sets { }0iA C= = , that is, all non-treated observations 
(within the common support) are used. In this application, kernel-based (as well as local lin-
ear) matching estimators always performed worse than the simple NN-matching in terms of 
balancing out pre-treatment differences in the outcome variables. Therefore, only the NN-
matching results are discussed and reported.    
3.2 The Counterfactuals of Interest, the Strategy of Job Searchers and the 
Policy Questions 
To apply the methods described in the last subsection to the evaluation of the effects of FTCs 
one has to take the following features of the dataset into account (see section 4 for descrip-
tion of the dataset used): 
• Due to the fact that an unemployed person who has entered into an FTC (and is, there-
fore, ‘treated’) can become unemployed again, she or he can also become a ‘control’ for 
another treated person. 
• If an unemployed person does not enter into an FTC job after a certain number of months 
of unemployment she or he can enter into an FTC job in a later month or in a following 
unemployment spell. Thus a person may be a potential control after particular duration of 
unemployment as well as a treated person at a later point in time. 
• The starting date of the treatment is not unique, i.e. FTC jobs can be entered in every 
month between 1991 and 2000. 
• The date of the inflow into unemployment is not unique. Hence, not only the starting 
date of the treatment differs but also unemployment duration before the treatment.  
• There is not only one treatment per person possible but persons can enter more than once 
into FTCs (after becoming unemployed again). 
 
The implications of these issues will be discussed in the following sections. It will be ex-
plained how the application of hazard rate models for the estimation of the propensity score 
may be a suitable approach to these issues. Recently some of the ideas presented in the fol-
lowing have been formalised by FREDRIKSSON and JOHANSSON (2003).   
 
Existence versus non-existence of fixed-term contracts 
In general one can think of two different counterfactuals which are linked to the decisions of 
job searchers and, therefore, imply different policy questions (see the summary in Table 
1).22  
A first possible job searcher’s decision may be – depending on the characteristics of the 
individual and the attributes of the (desired) job offers – never to enter into any FTC job. 
This would imply a non-treatment group of unemployed individuals who never enter into 
FTCs. This definition is in line with the design in almost every evaluation study where the 
control group consists of people who never enter into the evaluated programme (during the 
                                              
22  See HECKMAN, LALONDE and SMITH (1999: Section 3.2) for a general discussion of this issue.  
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period time covered by the dataset). The corresponding policy question is, whether the exis-
tence of the institution “fixed-term contract” helps unemployed to find stable employment 
relationships. This kind of non-treatment definition is referred to as Definition 1 (DEF.1) in 
the following. Non-treated individuals according to DEF.1 are individuals who never enter 
into FTCs within the whole period of time they are observed in the dataset used.   
 
Entering into an FTC job versus continuing to search for a permanent job 
A second possible behaviour of job searchers, which is in line with some of the theoretical 
discussion in section 2, may be to enter into FTCs after having tried to find a permanent con-
tract job (or waiting for permanent contract job offers, respectively) for several months of 
unemployment. This means that a non-treated person after a particular unemployment dura-
tion can become a treated person at a later point of time in the unemployment spell and can, 
therefore, be a treated as well as a control person. SIANESI (2001a) proposed this definition 
of non-treatment in the context of the evaluation of active labour market policy in Sweden. 
She does not differentiate between different kinds of measures for the unemployed, i.e. there 
is only one treatment (all type of programmes) compared to one non-treatment (unemploy-
ment). The methodological problem is that almost every unemployed person in Sweden does 
participate in any programme sooner or later, so the non-treatment DEF.1 introduced in the 
last section seems not to be a reasonable concept. She states that the reason that an unem-
ployed individual does not participate in a programme is because she or he has found a job 
before. Therefore, the participation decision is sequential over time. This, however, implies 
that individuals who have never participated are those who were successful in finding a job 
before. Non-treated DEF.1 may, therefore, bias the estimated treatment effect towards nega-
tive values (see FREDRIKSSON and JOHANSSON, 2003).23   
The idea of a sequential participation decision can be applied to the evaluation of the ef-
fects of FTCs: Let  denote the duration of an unemployment spell before an individual 
exits into an FTC. Is it beneficial (in terms of future employment opportunities) to enter into 
an FTC after a certain duration of unemployment  in comparison to keep on searching for 
a permanent position? The corresponding policy question is whether or not it is beneficial for 
unemployed job-searchers to enter into FTC jobs in comparison to keeping on searching for 
a permanent contract job. In the following this definition of non-treated persons is referred to 
as Definition 2 (DEF.2). According to this definition non-treated persons can be control per-
sons after a particular unemployment duration as well as treated persons in later months or 
unemployment spells.24 To the best of my knowledge, besides SIANESI (2001a) and this pa-
per, there is no study available yet, in which DEF.2 is applied to define the group of non-
1T
1T
                                              
23  FREDRIKSSON and JOHANSSON (2003: 3) state about non-treated DEF.1: “By defining the comparison 
group in this way one is implicitly conditioning on the outcome variable since those who do not enter in fu-
ture time periods to a large extent consist of those who have had the luck of finding a job. Therefore, the 
conditional independence assumptions (…) do not hold and studies that define the comparison group in 
this way will generate estimates that are biased towards finding negative treatment effects when, in fact, 
none exist.” 
24   A justification can be found in HECKMAN, LALONDE and  SMITH (1999: 83): “The same individual may be 
in both groups if that person is treated at one time and untreated at another.”  
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treated persons. It can be seen in Table 1 that DEF.2 implies an increased number of poten-
tial control unemployment spells in comparison to DEF.1.    
Table 1: Definitions of non-treatment 
 Counterfactual of         
interest 
Non-treated persons  Number of  
non-treated * 
Policy question 
DEF.1 World without FTCs 
for individual i  
Unemployed who do 
never enter into FTC 
jobs  
Spells: 1,271 
Persons: 1,041  
Does the existence of FTC 
jobs increase the long-term 
employment prospects of 
those unemployed who enter 
into FTCs? 
DEF.2 World without FTC 
job offers up to the 
unemployment dura-
tion  for indi-
vidual i  
1 1T +
Unemployed who do 
not enter into FTC 
jobs before unem-
ployment duration 
  1 1T +
Spells: 1,826 
Persons: 1,447  
Do unemployed persons tak-
ing the first opportunity (FTC 
job offers) enhance their future 
employment prospect in com-
parison to those who continue 
searching (for perm. jobs)? 
Note: * the numbers refer to spells with non-missing explanatory variables in the estimation of the 
propensity score and the period 1991-2000 which do not end in transitions to FTCs. 
 
Unknown ‘start of non-treatment’  
A problem in every evaluation study using longitudinal data is that for the group of nonpar-
ticipants important time varying variables like ’unemployment duration prior to the treat-
ment’ are not defined (see LECHNER, 2002 as well as FREDRIKSSON and JOHANSSON, 2003). 
The unemployment duration before entering into the treatment (FTC)  is by definition for 
non-treated an ‘unobserved counterfactual’ , thus it is not possible to include it into the 
estimation of the propensity score (see SIANESI, 2001a).25 For example, GERFIN, LECHNER 
and STEIGER (2002) approach this problem by predicting for each non-participant a hypo-
thetical programme starting date using information which is available at the date of the in-
flow into unemployment. SIANESI (2001a) as well as BRODATY, CRÉPON and FOUGÈRE 
(2001) use a simple but intuitive approach. The propensity score is estimated by a duration 
model, which derives the probabilities of transiting from unemployment in the treatment 
conditional on having stayed unemployed for a certain number of months.26 In the following 





                                              
25  Again the counterfactuals (Ti1, ci=0) and  (Ti0, ci=1) are not observable.  
26  To be exact, SIANESI (2001a) estimates for every period a probit conditional on having reached an unem-
ployment duration, which corresponds to the period. “This approach is equivalent to a discrete hazard 
model, with all the estimated parameters allowed to be duration-specific.” SIANESI (2001a: 17). 
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Repeated treatments (transitions to FTCs) 
As mentioned above, a person may enter more than once into an FTC job.27 In the analyses 
it will, however, not be considered whether a treatment is the person’s first one or not. A 
repeated treatment is interpreted as if the person had never entered into an FTC job from 
unemployment before.  
One alternative approach is to model repeated participation explicitly and to allow the re-
peated participation to have a different (additional) effect. This is done, for example, by 
BERGEMANN, FITZENBERGER and SPECKESSER (2001) for East German labour market pro-
grammes. Since repeated participation is a rare event in the dataset used, it does not seem to 
be possible to perform separate analyses for repeated treatments in this study. There are 349 
treatments (transitions to FTCs) observed in the dataset. 295 of them are by persons who 
enter into an FTC only once, 25 persons enter twice and one person takes up FTCs four 
times. A second alternative approach, which seems to be common practice, is to focus on the 
first treatment and to exclude a repeated treatment from the analysis or to include only those 
individuals who participate only once. This, however, may induce a selection bias, since 
‘unsuccessful’ FTC jobs (in terms of repeated transitions from unemployment to FTCs and 
the other way round) are systematically excluded. A similar line of argument applies to the 
non-treated: using only the first unemployment spell leads to sample selection towards 
“above average” controls (see HAM and LALONDE, 1996: 184).  
  
Illustration of the definition of treated and non-treated persons 
An example which documents the considerations in the previous subsections is depicted in 
Table 2. A monthly time scale, which may correspond to a certain calendar time, is as-
sumed.28 Person 1 becomes unemployed (U) in month 2, after having been employed in pe-
riod 1 (E). In month 7 the person is treated ( ), i.e. it enters into an FTC. (Remember that 
treatment is defined as entering into an FTC from unemployment but not being employed 
under an FTC).  
Table 2: Definition of treated and non-treated individuals 
Month 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
Person 1 E U U U U U E E E E E E U U U E E E 
Person 2 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ E U U E E E E E E E E E E E 
Person 3 E U U U U U U P E E E E E E E E E E E E 
Person 4 E E E U U U U U P E E E E U U U U U  E 
Notes: E = Employed; U = Unemployed ; = Entering into an FTC (Treatment); P = Entering into a 
permanent contract; ⋅ = missing observation 
                                              
27  This is called ‘multiple treatments’ or ‘dynamic treatments’ in the literature. So-called ‘dynamic treat-
ments’ are discussed in LECHNER and MIQUEL (2002) and are applied in BERGEMANN, FITZENBERGER and 
SPECKESSER (2001). 
28  Month 1 may be, for example, January 1993.  
 17
Person 1 is employed (without taking the type of contract into account) until month 13 and 
becomes unemployed again in month 14. In month 17 she or he again enters into an FTC, i.e. 
she or he is treated. As stated in the last subsection, a person can be in the treatment group 
for more than one time.29  
Person 2 is not in the sample (or the survey, respectively) until month 6, when she or he is 
employed. After having been unemployed for two months she or he enters into an FTC in 
month 9. Is person 2 a potential member of the control group for the first treatment of person 
1, assuming DEF.2 for non-treated persons?  It is a potential control person. The estimated 
propensity score will, however, probably be too different since the unemployment durations 
of both persons are very different in month 7. Person 3 is a potential control person for the 
first treatment of person 1. She or he can be used as a non-treated person in terms of both 
definitions of treatment, since she or he never enters into an FTC. Finally, person 4 is a po-
tential control group member of the second treatment of person 1, if DEF.2 is applied. 
3.3 Implementation of the Propensity Score Matching Estimator 
Taking into account the particularities of the dataset and the definitions of treated and non-
treated persons as presented in the previous subsections, it is now described how the match-
ing estimator is implemented.   
The main modification of the standard propensity score matching approach is to estimate 
the propensity score by a discrete hazard rate model. Thus treated and non-treated individu-
als are matched on the basis of the predicted transition probabilities from unemployment to 
FTCs, conditional on having stayed unemployed for a certain number of months.30  
Within the framework of discrete hazard rate models time is divided into intervals 
(months). The amount of time spent in unemployment is denoted by the random natural 
number T which is a realisation of a nonnegative and continuous random variable t. If an un-
employment spell ends within the interval [ ]1,t tI I− , then T = t. Besides transitions to several 
labour market states, the unemployment spell can end also due to right-censoring.  If T = t, a 
transition to another state occurs; if  T>t  the spell is right-censored. The discrete hazard rate 
is the probability of a transition of an individual in it’s k-th unemployment spell to labour 
market state C during month t, conditional unemployment has lasted until the beginning of t 
(see FAHRMEIER and TUTZ, 2001). Hence, the destination-specific hazard rate for the transi-
tion from unemployment in FTC jobs is given by ( )( ) ( )( )Pr , 1 ,FTCk ke t X t T t C X t T t≡ = = ≥k
                                             
. 
In order to keep the notation simple, the propensity score is again denoted by e.  
Additionally to matching on the propensity score, it is imposed that individuals are 
matched only within the same calendar month τ, which ensures that treated and controls face 
 
29  The person is then, however, considered as another person. This implies that it is equivalent for the analy-
sis whether one observes two unemployed persons which each enter once into an FTC or whether one ob-
serves one person who enters into FTCs twice (after being unemployed). 
30  A more formal justification for the consistency of this approach can be found in SIANESI (2001a) as well as 
FREDRIKSSON and JOHANSSON (2003). 
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the same economic environment (business cycle, season). In the following, some further 
issues are discussed in detail.  
 
Choice-based sampling  
The problem of choice-based sampling occurs if in the data used the probability of sampling 
a treated individual is not the population probability that an individual is a treated. This is 
certainly the case in the empirical analyses of this paper since the information on FTCs in the 
data imply that transitions to FTCs are likely to be systematically underrepresented in com-
parison to the population (see section 4). What does choice-based sampling implies for the 
estimated treatment effect?  
If there is choice-based sampling, weights are required to estimate consistently the propen-
sity score and thus the causal effect (see SMITH and TODD, 2003). When the weights are un-
known it can be shown that propensity score matching methods can still be applied by trans-
forming the estimated propensity scores  to odds ratios  e ( )1e e−  or log odds ratios, respec-
tively, and by matching on these instead.31 In case of NN-matching choice-based sampling 
does not seem to be a severe problem: It does not matter whether matching is performed on 
the odds ratio or on the propensity score, because the ranking of the observations is the same 
and, therefore, the same neighbours are selected (see SMITH and TODD, 2003).32 However, 
for methods using the absolute distance between observations, such as kernel-based match-
ing, it does matter. 
 
Common support condition 
Unlike parametric estimators, the consistency of matching depends crucially on the so-called 
common support condition (see HECKMAN, ICHIMURA and TODD, 1997). In case of propen-
sity score matching the condition requires that the distribution of the estimated propensity of 
the treated  is overlapped entirely by the distribution of the propensity score of the non-
treated . Here it means that for every unemployed person entering into an FTC a suffi-
ciently similar person (in terms of the estimated propensity score) who stays unemployed in 
the same calendar month has to be available.  
1e
0e
There are two common approaches to the problem of lacking common support (see 
LECHNER, 2001a): Either matching is performed only for the sub-population within the 
common support or the problem is simply ignored. The latter means, for example, in case of 
NN-matching using non-treated neighbours who are very different from the treated per-
sons.33 This approach can obviously lead to biased estimates due to ‘bad’ matches. Although 
the first approach is appropriate for obtaining a consistent estimate for the region of common 
support, that is, the region of the distribution where for every treated person there is a suffi-
cient similar non-treated individual in terms of the propensity score, it may be misleading: 
                                              
31  Ignoring choice-based sampling in the estimation of the propensity score is consistent since the odds ratio 
estimated using the incorrect weights (or no weights, respectively) is a scalar multiple of the true odds ra-
tio, which is itself a monotonic transformation of the propensity score. 
32  Any transformation of the propensity score which preserves the order of the observations does not affect 
consistency of the NN-matching estimator (see LECHNER, 1998). 
33  LECHNER (2001a) proposes a further approach. 
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“When treatment effects are heterogeneous inside and outside the common support, then the 
estimated effect does no longer correspond to the original parameter of interest.” (LECHNER, 
2001a: 21). Otherwise, if the treatment effect is homogeneous, at least within the treatment 
group, no additional problems appear besides the loss of information, that is, loss of effi-
ciency of the estimator (see BLUNDELL and COSTAS DIAS, 2000: 449).  
In this study the common support condition is imposed for every single calendar month τ. 
In concrete terms, for every month between 1991 and 2000 it is checked whether there is an 
overlap in the distribution of the estimated propensity score of treated and non-treated per-
sons. Treated persons outside the range of the distribution of the propensity score of non-
treated persons are excluded. Furthermore, the caliper is an additional safeguard against the 
violation of the common support. The caliper is chosen by taking into account the trade-off 
between unbiasedness (reduction in the error variance) in case of narrow calipers and loss of 
observations. The matching estimator ‘psmatch’ implemented by SIANESI (2001b) for 
STATA is used and is modified accordingly.  
 
Standard errors 
From equation (1) it can be seen that the estimated TT is the difference of two means. A sta-
tistical test on the significance of this difference is a simple t-test. For this purpose the vari-
ance of the TT  has to be calculated as well. It has to be taken into account that matching 
with replacement is performed, i.e. a non-treated person can serve for more than one treated 
person as a control. Following SIANESI (2001a) and LECHNER (2001b) independent observa-
tions, fixed weights and homoskedasticity of the outcome variable within the treated and the 
control group are assumed. Furthermore, the variance is assumed not to depend on the fact 
that the propensity score is estimated and the estimated probabilities are applied for a re-
duced sample due to the common support condition (see LECHNER, 2002: 29).  Given these 
assumptions the variance of TT in case of NN-matching is calculated as 














 )0 0= ,    (9) 
where  is the number of times a non-treated person is used as a control (see also HUJER, 
CALIENDO and THOMSEN, 2003, footnote 12). As mentioned above, the variance increases 
with . A potential problem is the assumption in (9) that the variance is not influenced by 
the fact that the propensity score is an estimated variable. A possible solution to the problem 
is to calculate the variance based on bootstrapping (see LECHNER, 2002).  However, in this 
paper the problem is ignored in order to avoid time-consuming calculations. This may be 
justified by the result in LECHNER (2002) that there seems to be little difference between the 




Anticipatory effects (Ashenfelter’s Dip) 
A common knowledge in evaluation of ALMP is that treatments may influence not only the 
outcome after the participation but also already before participations. It has been observed in 
a number of studies, that shortly before participating in a certain training programme earn-
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ings and employment situations of the future participants deteriorated, which has been 
termed “Ashenfelter’s Dip” (see HECKMAN and SMITH 1999; FITZENBERGER and PREY 2000; 
BERGEMANN, FITZENBERGER and SPECKESSER 2001).34 Usually, this transitory decline in 
employment and wages of participants is explained by anticipatory effects: In expectation of 
participation, search activities are reduced, leading on average to reduced employment prob-
abilities and wages. Since treatment affects pre-treatment variables, the CIA is violated.  
It is likely that anticipatory effects are also relevant for the transition to FTC jobs. Many 
job searchers know several months before the actual transition occurs that they will take up a 
job soon and some will already have signed the employment contract. Anticipatory effects 
lead ceteris paribus to reduced FTC hazard rates months before the transition occurs. Thus it 
is likely that control persons with too low estimated propensity scores are matched. If one 
assumes that persons with higher FTC hazard rates are those with better characteristics 
(causing better employment opportunities), the estimated effect of FTCs (on future employ-
ment opportunities) is biased upwards, since the group of control persons has worse charac-
teristics on average.  
There is no clear cut solution to this problem. One straightforward but arbitrary approach is 
to match treated and non-treated persons on the basis of the estimated propensity score not 
by the month of transition but some months earlier.35 Although I could not find any evidence 
for a decline in the employment probability before the treatment in an earlier version of this 
paper, I will try to avoid the violation of the CIA by assuming that anticipatory effects start 
not earlier than two months before the transition to the FTCs. Thus, treated and control per-
sons are matched two months before the treatment occurs. If anticipatory effects are strong 
and start ‘early’ this is obviously only an incomplete solution to the problem. However, the 
results turn out to be quite robust with respect to different specifications concerning the 
month of matching.  
 
Check on matching quality 
A simple and intuitive test for whether the matching approach is able to balance the selection 
bias consists of t-tests on the differences in the outcome variables between the group of 
treated and the group of control persons before the treatment (the transition to the FTC).36 
This is tested up to 24 months before the treatment for the monthly measured outcome vari-
ables and up to 3 years for the yearly measured outcome variables (for the description of the 
outcome variables see section 4). For this application it turns out, that NN-matching seems to 
be more suitable than different types of kernel-based matching procedures for generating 
appropriate control groups in the sense of this test.  
 
                                              
34  This phenomenon was observed for the first time by ASHENFELTER (1978) for the earnings effects of a 
training programme. 
35  This approach is in line with interpretation of anticipatory effects as an earlier start of the treatment.  
36  Note that this is a variant of the pre-programme test introduced in HECKMAN and HOTZ (1989) for regres-
sion models.    
 21
4 Data base and Definition of Variables 
Data base and estimation sample 
The data base is the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) for 1991 until 2001. The 
GSOEP is a representative household survey of the German population, conducted on an 
annual basis.37 A useful feature of the GSOEP is the availability of monthly information 
between yearly interviews (so-called calendar). Different employment states are covered. 
These information are collected by retrospective questions about what happened in particular 
months within the previous year.  
Unfortunately, the type of contract is not collected on a monthly basis in the GSOEP. The 
type of contract is only asked for the current job at the date of the interview. It is, however, 
possible to derive monthly information, taking legal regulations on FTCs into account. It is 
not allowed for employers to employ a person with an FTC after the same person was em-
ployed with a permanent contract. Thus, while it is allowed to transform a temporary con-
tract into a permanent one the other direction is not permitted. This means that if a person is 
currently employed with an FTC at a certain employer that she/he was already hired into an 
FTC.  
Using this information, the type of contract (FTC vs permanent contract vs self-employed) 
is not defined for approximately 30 % of all hirings. These undefined spells are obviously 
more often short-term (that is the reason why they are not observed in the months of inter-
view), so it is likely that there are many FTC spells within this category, which may induce a 
severe selection problem. It is possible to reduce the amount of undefined spells to approxi-
mately 18% by using information concerning the reason of the end of the last employment 
spell (due to the expiration of an FTC or an apprenticeship contract). However, using this 
information one identifies “unsuccessful” FTCs with a higher probability, i.e. those FTCs 
which do not lead to a long-term employment relationship at the same employer. For this 
reason, the latter information is not used for the definition of employment spells. 
To check the significance of this problem, a maximum-likelihood probit model with sam-
ple selection was estimated (see VAN DE VEN and VAN PRAGG, 1981). In the first probit 
equation, the transition to any type of employment (including “undefined spells”) is ana-
lysed, in the second probit equation the FTC hazard rate. The error terms of both equations 
are assumed to be jointly normally distributed. At least one exclusion restriction is needed in 
order to avoid that identification is solely achieved from distributional assumptions. If the 
correlation of the error terms is not zero, a separate estimation of the FTC hazard rate leads 
to biased results. This is checked by performing LR-tests comparing the likelihood of the full 
model (the simultaneous estimation of the FTC hazard and overall hazard) with the sum of 
the likelihoods for the separate estimated FTC hazard and overall hazard.  
                                              
37  Details on the GSOEP can be obtained from the web-server of the German Institute of Economic Research 
(DIW) in Berlin (http://www.diw-berlin.de/soep/). 
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Various estimations with different exclusion restrictions were performed. The lowest p-
value of the LR-test was 0.3825. Since all LR-tests in all specifications show that the corre-
lation of the error terms is not significant, one can conclude that estimation of the FTC haz-
ard rate model is probably not biased by the sampling scheme, since the selection effects are 
either captured by observable variables or there is no selection bias at all. One should, how-
ever, keep in mind that the probit with sample selection model is based on some restrictive 
distributional assumptions as well as the choice of appropriate exclusion restrictions which 
may drive the results to a large extent. Therefore, all the results should be interpreted keep-
ing in mind that short FTC spells are likely to be underrepresented. Insofar as the sampling 
scheme corresponds to choice-based sampling as described in subsection 3.3, NN-matching 
does not yield biased results. For the analyses, those unemployment spells ending in em-
ployment spells with undefined employment contracts are simply dropped.  
Participants in Public Employment Measures (ABM) hold FTCs by definition. In order to 
distinguish regular FTCs from these types of subsidised employment, ABM spells are de-
fined as unemployment spells in the analyses. This definition seems to be reasonable since a 
certain duration of unemployment is usually a necessary condition for participation.38     
The estimation sample consists of individuals, registered as unemployed for at least one 
month between January 1991 and December 2000. In order to obtain an inflow sample only 
spells are used which start after January 1991, i.e. left-censored spells are excluded. Since 
there exist a number of formal and informal early-retirement measures in Germany only per-
sons not older than 58 years are included. The minimum age for being in the sample is 18 
years. One may argue that this is – given the comparatively long period of education in 
Germany – too young to ensure that only unemployed persons are included which are really 
job searchers. However, it is interesting to include younger workers since temporary jobs 
may be important for the transition from school or apprenticeship to work (see RYAN, 2001).    
 
Definition of the outcome variables 
An overview of the definition of the outcome measures used in the analysis can be found in 
Table 3. The first and probably most important outcome is the future probability of being 
employed with a permanent contract. Since – as mentioned above – the type of contract is 
only observed by the date of interview in the raw data, this outcome variable is only annually 
measured at the dates of interviews. So the effect will be the difference in the probability of 
being employed under a permanent contract between the treated and control group in the 
year following the next. The year of interview following the transition is not taken into ac-
count because in many cases it is exactly the information which is used to define the start of 
the employment spell as an FTC job or a permanent contract job. The question whether the 
actual employment contract is temporary or permanent is not available for all waves of the 
                                              
38  Public Employment Measures (ABM) cannot be distinguished from ‘regular’ FTCs in 1996. For this year 
FTC workers are defined as public employment measure participants if they are employed in the public 
sector and declare to be unemployed. Nevertheless, it is likely that there are still participants among those 
entering FTCs. However, the proportion of Public Employment Measures in FTC employment is about 5 % 
in West Germany, thus, the problem may not be too severe (see RUDOLPH, 2000).   
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panel study. Until 1995 only those who reported job changes were asked about the type of 
contract. From 1995 onwards all necessary information is available. This is no problem for 
the identification of transitions to FTCs or permanent contracts, that is, the estimation of the 
propensity score. It implies, however, that the first outcome variable is only measured from 
1996 until 2001 (at least one year after the transition to the FTC).  
Table 3: Definition of the outcome variables 
Outcome 1    
1996-2001 
annual information 
Probability of being employed under a permanent contract in the year 
following the next, collected by the months of interviews. 
Outcome 2   
1991-2000 
monthly information 
Probability of employment (all types of contracts apart from training-on-




Probability of (registered) unemployment within each of the following 36 




Probability of being out-of-labour-force (including school/ university but 





Probability of being employed under an FTC in the year following the 
next, collected by the months of interviews. (DEF.2 only). 
 
The second outcome measure is derived from the monthly calendar. The effect is the dif-
ference in the employment probability between treated and controls within each of the 36 
months following the treatment (transition). Monthly data are only available until 2000 (the 
monthly information is collected retrospectively) so that the other outcome measures are 
only available up to this date. Employment is now defined broadly as FTC and permanent 
contract employment as well as self-employment but not training-on-the-job. The third out-
come variable is again derived from the monthly calendar. The effect is the difference in the 
probability of registered unemployment between treated and controls within each of the 36 
months following the treatment. The fourth outcome variable is the risk of being out-of-
labour-force. Finally, the fifth outcome variable is the probability of being employed under 
an FTC in the year following the next. Note that this is an annually measured variable com-
parable with outcome 1. Furthermore, outcome 5 is not defined for non-treated DEF.1, since 
DEF.1 requires that non-treated individuals never enter into an FTC, i.e. the mean outcome 
of the non-treated is fixed at zero.   
A potential problem arises due to the fact that the outcome variables are not observable for 
all 36 months after the transitions to FTCs. Some persons do not answer all questions (item 
non-response) and others drop out from the whole survey (sample attrition). For the outcome 
variables sample attrition is particularly important. Generally, there are two approaches to 
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deal with this problem. Either, one uses only the balanced panel, i.e. one excludes all persons 
with incomplete information in the outcome variables, or one uses all available information 
and accepts a decreasing number of observations with increasing time-lag to the month of 
treatment (unbalanced panel).   
Using the first approach, one has to assume that selection into the sample (the balanced 
panel) is random, i.e. the sample still represents the underlying population. For the second 
approach one has to assume that the probability of missing values in the outcome variables 
are the same for the treated and the control group, i.e. the matching estimator balances the 
differences out. This is unlikely if the probability of missing outcomes does not depend on 
the covariates which are included in the propensity score estimation.   
In order to get an impression of the problem of missing values, a variable for the unbal-
anced panel is defined, which includes the number of months with missing values during the 
following 36 months.39 Using the same NN-matching procedure as for the second outcome 
variable (see section 6) it is checked whether there are differences in the number of missing 
observations in the treated and matched control sample. It turns out that there is a mean dif-
ference which is, however, not statistical significant at the 10 % level. The average number 
of missing months is 8.9 in the treated sample and 8.3 in the control sample. The correspond-
ing t-statistic of 0.59 indicates that the difference is not statistically significant different from 
zero.  
One can conclude that there is sample attrition in the outcome variable but no strong evi-
dence in favour of induced sample selection bias. Thus the “unbalanced panel approach” is 
used since the bias generated by simply dropping incomplete data may be worse than the 
bias due to a declining number of observations with an increasing time-lag to the treatment. 





                                              
39  Of course it would be more appropriate to check the problems of missing values for every single month. 
Unfortunately (or rather fortunately) there are not enough missing values to do this.  
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5 Specification and Estimation of the Discrete Hazard Rate 
Model – Estimation of the Propensity Score 
5.1 Specification  
As mentioned above the propensity score is estimated by a discrete hazard rate (duration) 
model. Since the unemployment spells in the GSOEP are measured in months it seems to be 
a natural approach to specify a discrete time model instead of a continuous time hazard rate 
model.40 The method applied and the specification is not discussed in detail. A further 
description can be found in HAGEN (2003).  
Four different destination (exit) states are taken into account: FTC jobs, permanent con-
tract jobs (including self-employment)41, a category termed “training” consisting of on-the-
job training and apprenticeship as well as an out-of-labour-force status (including school and 
university). A further distinction between the types of contracts implies that a differentiation 
between full- and part-time is not feasible due to the limited sample size. Table A2 in the 
Appendix displays the number of transitions and the average duration of the prior unem-
ployment spells.  
In order to compare the determinants of the transition to FTCs and to permanent contracts 
a discrete independent competing risk model is estimated by a multinomial logit model 
without controlling for unobserved heterogeneity (see FAHRMEIER and TUTZ, 2001).42 The 
propensity score is, however, estimated by a simple logistic model (again without controlling 
for unobserved heterogeneity) for the exit into FTCs only. By doing this, it is avoided that 
the estimated parameters corresponding to the exit into FTC jobs are biased by specification 
errors with regard to the other exit states.  
Due to the limited sample size, the analysis is performed for men and women together, 
which is, given the well-known substantial differences in labour force behaviour, a serious 
restriction. However, differences are taken into account as far as possible by allowing impor-
tant variables to have a gender-specific impact.  
The base-line hazard is specified non-parametrically in the form of piece-wise constant 
dummy variables.43 Besides the usual characteristics (qualification, age, gender, nationality, 
disabilities, marital status), variables on previous labour market experience are included, 
which may be important signals for employers and which are likely to capture individual 
heterogeneity of the unemployed job searchers. The duration of the last employment and 
                                              
40  Other examples of discrete unemployment duration models with the GSOEP are, for example, STEINER 
(2001) as well as HUJER and SCHNEIDER (1996).  
41  Due to the sample size a further differentiation between self-employment and paid employment seems to 
be not feasible. For an analysis of the hazard rate into self-employment in West Germany see REIZE (2000).   
42  An extended multinomial model which controls for unobserved heterogeneity (HECKMAN and SINGER, 
1984) and further duration analyses can be found in HAGEN (2003).  
43  The number of observations is too small for defining for every single month of unemployment duration a 
separate dummy variable.  
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unemployment spells is included (“lagged duration dependence”, see HECKMAN and BORJAS, 
1980). Furthermore, the number of previous unemployment spells is included in order to 
control for “occurrence dependence”. For checking whether there is state dependence in the 
type of the employment contract, a dummy variable indicating whether the person has ever 
held an FTC before and dummy variables describing the reason for the end of the last em-
ployment contract (‘due to end of an FTC or apprenticeship contract’ and ‘due to dismissal’) 
are included.  
The monthly federal state unemployment rate is included to control for regional labour 
demand.44 After controlling for unemployment the federal state dummies become insignifi-
cant and are, therefore, excluded. Descriptive statistics can be found in Table A3 in the Ap-
pendix.    
5.2 Estimation Results 
The estimation results of the multinomial logistic hazard rate model are depicted in Table A4 
in the Appendix. The log-likelihood ratio tests proposed by CRAMER and RIDDER (1991) 
confirm that the differences in the destination-specific regression coefficients are statistically 
significant at the 1% level.45 Thus FTC and permanent contract jobs are indeed behaviour-
ally distinct states. The marginal effects of the estimated coefficients for the FTC and the 
permanent contract hazard rates, evaluated at the means of the X covariates and multiplied 
by 100, can be found in Table 4. The marginal effects of dummy variables are calculated as 
discrete changes in the expected value of the hazard rates as the dummy changes from 0 to 1. 
Due to the very time consuming calculations it was not feasible to calculate standard errors 
for the marginal effects. Therefore, the t-values of the corresponding coefficients (Table A4 
in the Appendix) are reported. Furthermore, the relative risk (odds ratio) to exit into an FTC 
instead of a permanent contract is reported. 
The following results are of particular interest: 
• There is no clear cut pattern of duration dependence in the transition to FTCs and perma-
nent contracts. If one focuses on long-term unemployed (more than 12 months), then 
there is a tendency for positive duration dependence in the FTC hazard rate and negative 
duration dependence in the permanent contract hazard rate. This result is in line with the 
theoretical considerations but should be interpreted with care since neglected unobserved 
heterogeneity can bias the results of the baseline hazard. 
• The variables ‘end of previous job due to expiration of an FTC or apprenticeship con-
tract’ and ‘never an FTC before’ have a significantly positive effects on the transition to 
FTCs. In the same way, ‘end of previous job due to dismissal’ has a positive effect and 
‘end of previous job due to expiration of an FTC or apprenticeship contract’ has a nega-
tive effect on the permanent contract hazard rate. This is in line with the predictions of 
                                              
44  Obviously, it would be more suitable to use regional units, which approximate regional labour markets 
more accurate, such as, for example, travel-to-work-areas. Unfortunately the necessary information on the 
individuals’ place of residence is not included in the GSOEP.     
45  Furthermore a Hausman test on the IIA was performed. The null hypothesis of independence could not be 
rejected.   
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dual labour market theory.46 There is, however, an alternative interpretation: individuals 
who did not pass the transition from apprenticeship (which may also be interpreted as a 
kind of probationary period) to permanent contract employment within a firm have to en-
ter again into an additional probationary period, that is, an FTC.  
• Typical characteristics having been found to prolong unemployment duration in other 
studies, such as disabilities, being a foreigner, being female and having children, do not 
affect the FTC hazard rate, but have a significantly negative effect on the permanent con-
tract hazard rate. To put it in another way: The relative risk of entering into an FTC in-
stead of a permanent contract is 2 for disabled persons (relative to persons without dis-
abilities), 1.5 for foreigners (relative to German) and 1.9 for women with children (rela-
tive to men without children).  
• Opposed to theoretical predictions, the positive effect of not receiving unemployment 
compensation is stronger for the permanent contract hazard rate. The odds ratios are, 
however, not statistically significant. Furthermore, it is well-known that the actual receipt 
of unemployment compensation cannot be treated as exogenous, i.e. the estimated coef-
ficients are not reliable.   
 
A further interpretation of the results is beyond the scope of this paper (see for a more de-
tailed discussion HAGEN, 2003).  
In order to estimate the propensity score, the risk of leaving unemployment is estimated 
separately for the exits into FTCs, keeping the other exits as right censored at the time of 
completion.47 Those variables which have no statistically significant effects on the FTC haz-
ard rate are excluded from estimation. Remember that the vector of covariates X should con-
tain all the variables that are thought to simultaneously influence participation and outcome. 
If a variable is insignificant in the FTC hazard rate estimation, this does not mean that it does 
not affect the outcome, but there are no significant differences in the variable between 











                                              
46  Note that these coefficients are also significant in specifications controlling for unobserved heterogeneity 
(see HAGEN, 2003).  
47  See NARENDRANATHAN and STEWART (1993: 68) for a justification of this approach.  
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Table 4: Estimation Results of the (multinomial logistic) competing risk hazard rate model – 
marginal effects and relative risk of entering into FTC versus entering into perm. contract 




Exit into        
PERM 











Baseline hazard        
   Month  2 – 3 0.153  0.539  3.39   2.424  8.04 0.680 -1.91
   Month  4 – 6 0.168  0.481  3.01  1.802  6.15 0.775 -1.20
   Month  7 – 9 0.121  0.286  1.65  2.225  6.29 0.584 -2.12
   Month 10 – 12 0.086  0.933  3.88  2.270  5.51 0.948 -0.19
   Month 13 – 18  0.106  0.544  2.43  2.833  6.57 0.628 -1.62
   Month 19 ≥ 0.169  0.853  3.50  1.688  4.08 1.068  0.22
Age   39.212 -0.129 -0.76 -0.278 -1.09 0.996 -0.02
Age2 / 1,000 17.092  0.520  1.10  1.084  1.55 1.038  0.05
Age3 / 100,000  80.778 -0.067 -1.60 -0.137 -2.23 0.993 -0.11
No occupational qualification 0.421 -0.317 -2.96 -0.782 -4.73 1.045  0.27
Master craftsman 0.045 -0.127 -0.58   0.311  0.90 0.729 -0.97
University graduate 0.064  0.487  2.61    0.538  1.89 1.234  0.95
Female 0.492 -0.019 -0.06  0.215  0.54 0.871 -0.35
Disabled 0.117  0.093  0.54 -0.895 -3.36 2.004  2.63
Foreigner 0.365  0.063  0.44 -0.630 -3.78 1.527  2.61
Married 0.633  0.188  0.94 -0.072 -0.25 1.306  0.95
Married x female 0.311 -0.297 -1.13 -0.121 -0.27 0.734 -0.80
No partner  0.299 -0.198 -1.10 -0.539 -1.96 1.061  0.22
No partner x female 0.147  0.537  1.65  0.629  1.38 1.249  0.58
Children < 16 0.398 -0.082 -0.56  0.007 -0.02 0.903 -0.46
Children x female 0.217   0.003  0.01 -0.983 -3.51 1.855  2.06
Prev. job: end of FTC or apprenticeship 0.104  0.819  3.60  0.472  1.49 1.625  1.89
Prev. job: end of FTC or appr. x female 0.053 -0.352 -1.86 -0.340 -0.91 0.725 -0.89
Prev Job: dismissed 0.260  0.217  1d.31  1.391  5.41 0.680 -1.74
Prev Job: dismissed x female 0.119 -0.044 -0.19 -0.471 -1.61 1.253  0.70
Out-of-labour-force before 0.196  0.526  1.93 -0.247 -0.59  1.936  1.91
Out-of-labour-force before x female 0.128 -0.420 -1.82 -0.716 -1.67 0.845 -0.39
Training or school before 0.127  0.449  2.39  0.414  1.62 1.274  1.06




… Table 4 continued 




Exit into        
PERM 











Prev. employment spell 3-5 months 0.047  0.953  3.43  0.822  2.27 1.500   1.43
Prev. employment spell 6-8 months 0.055  0.642  2.53  -0.206 -0.51 2.002   2.32
Prev. employment spell 9-11 months 0.029  0.282  1.09  2.055  4.44 0.631  -1.38
Prev. employment spell 12-20 months 0.047  0.241  1.05  0.874  2.43  0.875  -0.45
Prev. employment spell > 20 months 0.182   0.199  1.30  0.756  3.35 0.870  -0.69
Already ever an FTC before 0.115  0.403  2.69  -0.280 -1.34 1.757   3.02
Public sector before 0.102  0.358  2.25 -0.128 -0.53 1.544   2.13
Numb. of prev. unemployment spells 0.818 -0.057 -0.78 -0.033 -0.28 0.952  -0.50
Numb. of prev. unemployment spells2 2.602  0.017  1.90  0.031  2.20 1.003   0.28
Log net household income 7.253   -0.049 -2.65 -0.042 -1.38 0.965  -1.35
No unemployment benefit 0.449  0.256  2.62  0.874  5.59 0.857  -1.04
No unemployment assistance 0.808  0.619  5.19  1.690  8.40 0.744  -1.22
Log regional unemployment rate  2.222 -0.046 -0.28 -1.108 -3.65 1.709   1.88
Spell started in first quarter 0.347 -0.517 -4.46 -0.870 -4.69 0.845  -0.92
Spell started in second quarter 0.273 -0.454 -3.88 -0.690 -3.77 0.813  -1.09
Spell started in third quarter 0.209 -0.269 -2.27  -0.270 -1.39 0.819  -1.07
1992 0.069  0.044  0.13  0.310  0.65 0.902  -0.19
1993 0.104 -0.008 -0.00  -0.339 -0.72 1.203   0.34
1994 0.134  0.415  0.94  0.058  0.16  1.472   0.75
1995 0.135   0.237  0.58 -0.031 -0.02 1.312   0.52
1996 0.141  0.214  0.50 -0.360 -0.78 1.549   0.83
1997 0.139  0.196  0.48  0.214  0.45 1.110   0.20
1998 0.116  0.894  1.71  0.042  0.16 2.108   1.42
1999 0.088   0.751  1.51  0.967  1.79 1.265   0.45
2000 0.048 1.924  2.93 3.254  4.56 1.209 0.37
Predicted (relative) prob. of exit (in %) 0.843 1.872  45.032
Note: The marginal effects of dummy variables are calculated as discrete changes in the expected 
value of the dependent variable. The “t-stat” is from the corresponding coefficients in Table A4 in the 
Appendix. The odds ratio is the exponential of the corresponding coefficient defining “exit into per-
manent contracts” as base category. 
Reference category: men, cohabit with a partner, vocational training, no partner, no children, not 
disabled, German nationality, previous job quit, never an FTC job before, previous employment spell 
1-2 month, not out-of-labour before, not training or school before, receives unemployment benefit or 






6 Results: Effects of Entering into Fixed-Term Contracts 
For both definitions of ‘non-treated’ individuals, simple NN-matching (with caliper) is per-
formed (see Table A6 in the Appendix).48 The command ‘psmatch’ implemented by SIANESI 
(2001b) in STATA 7.0 is used in a modified form, which imposes the common support con-
dition for every calendar month. The caliper is chosen by taking into account the trade-off 
between reducing the bias, on the one hand, and minimizing the loss of (treated) observa-
tions, on the other. The caliper is set in most cases to  which turned out to be a 
reasonable compromise. In subsection 6.2 the mean effects are reported while subsection 6.3 
presents effects for particular groups of individuals. The next subsection presents some 
checks on the matching quality.   
0.03 Ψ =
6.1 Matching Quality 
Is it plausible to assume that selection into FTC jobs is caused only by observable variables, 
that is, to consider the CIA to be fulfilled?  Of course it seems unrealistic to assume that all 
variables affecting the FTC hazard and outcome variables simultaneously are included in the 
propensity score. Nevertheless, one may argue that the variables relating to individuals pre-
vious labour market experiences may capture unobserved characteristics of the unemployed. 
This statement seems to be confirmed by the estimation results.  
Is the NN-matching estimator able to balance out observable pre-treatment differences be-
tween the treated and the control group of the non-treated? In order to answer this question 
some results for non-treated DEF.1 and outcome 2 one month after the transition to the FTC 
is presented in detail. The reason is that it is obviously more complicated to balance out dif-
ferences in case of DEF.1 since there are fewer non-treated individuals available.  
 As mentioned above, the common support condition requires that for every unemployed 
individual entering into an FTC a sufficiently similar non-treated person in terms of the pre-
dicted propensity score should be available for each single month. The latter is necessary 
since matching is conditioned on the same calendar month, i.e. treated and control persons 
are matched only within the same calendar month. If for a treated person there is no suffi-
ciently similar non-treated person available she or he cannot be used in the analysis and is 
excluded. Unfortunately, this procedure leads to a significant loss of observations (see Table 
5). A further substantial reduction of observations is a result of imposing the non-treated to 
be within the caliper. As expected, less observations are lost in case of DEF.2. The differ-
ence of the samples of DEF.1 and DEF.2 implies that a comparison of the effects with regard 
to the non-treated definition is possibly not meaningful (see section 3.3 for a discussion).   
 
 
                                              
48  Furthermore, several kernel-based matching estimators where checked (see sections 3.1 and 3.3). It turns 
out that the performance in terms of balancing out pre-treatment differences of NN-matching is much better 
than that of kernel-based matching estimators. 
 31
Table 5: Loss of treated observations due to common support requirement and lack of similar 
non-treated within the caliper (NN-matching, outcome 2) 
Number of treatments (transitions to FTCs) DEF.1 DEF.2 
Before matching 349 349 
Within common support  304 339 
Within the caliper (after NN- matching)  239 282 
 
Table 6: Means of important pre-treatment (X) variables before and after NN-Matching 
(DEF.1) 
 Before matching After matching 
 
1X  0X  p-value
a std. diff. 
%b 1
X  0X   p-value
a std. diff. 
%b 
Propensity score -3.695 -5.055 0.000 132.47 -3.998 -3.998 0.994 0.04 
Dur. of unemployment 8.799 12.392 0.000 32.02 9.703 10.226 0.598 4.66 
Female  0.453 0.512 0.028 11.92 0.477 0.498 0.648 4.19 
Married 0.507 0.668 0.000 33.08 0.519 0.523 0.927 0.86 
Married × female 0.206 0.335 0.000 29.36 0.222 0.238 0.665 3.80 
Age 32.673 41.650 0.000 76.53 32.979 32.971 0.993 0.07 
Prev job: end of FTC or ap-
prenticeship 
0.244 0.055 0.000 54.67 0.172 0.134 0.253 10.94 
Prev job: end of FTC or ap-
prenticeship × female 
0.097 0.033 0.000 26.35 0.092 0.075 0.510 6.83 
Dur. of previous unempl. spell 2.739 3.207 0.310 6.30 3.285 2.707 0.367 7.78 
Dur. of previous empl. spell  13.146 16.579 0.091 10.43 13.431 15.489 0.473 6.25 
Out-of-labour-force before 0.129 0.225 0.000 25.42 0.146 0.197 0.146 13.25 
Training or school before 0.192 0.115 0.000 21.49 0.176 0.205 0.416 8.17 
Public service before 0.206 0.073 0.000 38.89 0.172 0.106 0.018 19.42 
University degree 0.163 0.042 0.000 40.83 0.084 0.059 0.287 8.44 
No occupational qualification 0.301 0.439 0.000 28.84 0.360 0.377 0.705 3.50 
Log household net income  6.793 7.302 0.000 20.48 7.008 6.939 0.765 2.77 
No unemployment benefit 0.476 0.439 0.175 7.30 0.444 0.531 0.055 17.64 
No unemployment assistance 0.883 0.815 0.001 18.87 0.849 0.870 0.511 5.86 
Log unemployment rate 2.256 2.205 0.006 18.82 2.257 2.236 0.318 7.99 
Number of obs 349 16,120     239 239   
Notes: The 16,120 observations in the non-treated group before matching correspond to 1,271 
spells. aTwo-sample t-test with unequal variance: H0: 1 0X X− = 0. bStandardised differences defined 
as ( ) ( )( )( )1 0 1 1 0 0 2X X V X V X− + . 
 
In Table 6 the means of characteristics of treated 1X  and non-treated workers 0X , as well as 
the matched FTCs and controls are depicted. T-tests indicate that the differences in the 
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means of nearly all covariates X are not significantly different from zero in the matched 
sample, while there are important differences before matching. This is confirmed by the 
standardised differences which are defined as  the absolute difference of the sample means 
in the treated 1X  and non-treated 0X  sub-samples  as  a percentage  of  the square root of 
the average of the sample variances in the treated  and non-treated  groups:  The stan-
dardized differences of all variables decline. Most important, there are no significant differ-
ences in the estimated propensity score anymore.  
1V 0V
As mentioned in section 3.3 a further check on whether matching was successful in gener-
ating a suitable control group is to perform t-tests on the differences between the means of 
the outcome variables in both groups before the treatment. These differences are shown in 
the subsequent sections.  
 
6.2 Mean Effects 
In the following, the TT for outcome variables 1 up to 5 and for both definitions of non-
treated are reported. First of all, the monthly measured outcome variables (2, 3, and 4) are 
reported, since they are useful to document the dynamics of the effects.     
 
Outcome 2 – Employment probability  1991-2000 
Figure 1 and Figure 2 present the difference in employment probabilities between treated 
and control persons including a 95 % confidence interval for non-treated DEF.1 and non-
treated DEF.2, respectively. Note that employment includes permanent contract jobs and 
FTC jobs but excludes training. Zero on the time axis represents the month of treatment, i.e. 
the transition from unemployment to an FTC job. The insignificant effect before the treat-
ment (-24 up to -3) indicates that the matching approach balanced pre-treatment differences 
in the employment status to a large extent. The matching quality seems to be slightly better 
in case of DEF.2, which can be explained by the fact that there are more potential controls 
available (see Table 1 in section 3.2). The figures suggest for both definitions that entering 
into FTC jobs increases the employment probability for up to 36 months after the transition. 
The similarities between the two definitions are surprising, given the dissimilarity of the 
concepts. The effects in case of DEF.2 seem to be slightly more positive.49 Whether the es-
timated positive employment effect is due to FTC or permanent contract jobs is assessed in 
the following.  
                                              
49  Note, that this is in line with the hypothesis that DEF.1 leads to an underestimation of positive effects (see 
the discussion in section 3.2 as well as FREDRIKSSON and JOHANSSON, 2003) 
 33
Figure 1: Employment effects – DEF.1 
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Figure 2: Employment effects – DEF.2 
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Outcome 3 – Unemployment probability  1991-2000 
Again it can be seen in Figure 3 and Figure 4 that in the matched samples there are almost no 
significant differences in the pre-treatment probability for being registered unemployed for 
both non-treated definitions. The result that approximately 17 months after the transition 
there are no significantly negative effect on the unemployment probability anymore while 
Figure 2 and Figure 3 indicate that there are positive employment effects seems to be puz-
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Figure 4: Unemployment effects – DEF.2 
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Outcome 4 – Probability of being out-of-labour-force 1991-2000 
Indeed Figure 5 and Figure 6 indicate that entering into an FTC reduces the probability of 
being out-of-labour-force within the following 36 months. Therefore, one can conclude that 
the positive employment effect (outcome variable 2) is not accompanied by a lower prob-
ability of registered unemployment but by a reduced probability of being-out-of labour-
force. Obviously this effect is likely to be driven by women, younger or elderly workers. It is 
likely that FTCs are used for people (re-)entering the labour market. If they become unem-
ployed after the expiration of the contract they are more strongly attached to the labour mar-
ket since they have qualified for unemployment compensation and have possibly enhanced 
their prospects which reduces the risk of being out-of-labour-force.  
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Figure 5: Out-of-labour-force effect – DEF.1 
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Outcome 1 – Probability of holding a permanent contract 1996-2001  
Is there a positive employment effect only for FTC jobs or are individuals who have entered 
into an FTC also more likely to be employed as permanent contract workers after a given 
time? The effect on the probability of holding a permanent contract for non-treated DEF.1 is 
depicted in Table 7. First, it can be seen that even after matching there are some pre-
treatment differences in the probability of holding a permanent contract between the treated 
and the control group, which are, however, not statistically significant. Nevertheless, one 
should keep in mind that there may be some selection bias left. Up to 3 years after the transi-
tion to an FTC, the formerly unemployed raise their probability of holding a permanent con-
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tract. But only after 3 years the positive effect of 11 percentage points is statistically signifi-
cant. The effect four years after the transition is reported but should be interpreted with high-
est caution due to the loss of observations.  
Table 7: Probability of being employed under a permanent contract – DEF.1 
 All persons 
Year Mean treated Mean control Effect t-stat Pairs 
- 3 0.439 0.426 0.012 0.156 82 
- 2 0.333 0.433 -0.100 -1.574 120 
- 1 0.194 0.250 -0.056 -1.199 160 
+ 2 0.448 0.437 0.011 0.214 174 
+ 3 0.578 0.468 0.110 1.926 154 
+ 4 0.575 0.500 0.075 1.090 106 
Notes:  = 0.03. Ψ
 
In Table 8 the effects for DEF.2 are reported. Again there are still some minor pre-treatment 
differences in the probability of holding a permanent contract, which are, however, smaller 
as in case of DEF.1. The effect is now more clear-cut: After three years 59.7% of all unem-
ployed who had entered into FTCs hold permanent contracts. Only 43.5% of unemployed 
who had not entered into FTCs in a certain month (but possibly later) hold permanent con-
tracts. The difference (TT) of 16.1 percentage points is highly significant. In year +4, the 
effect is still significantly positive at the 5% level.  
Table 8: Probability of being employed under a permanent contract  – DEF.2    
 All persons 
Year  Mean treated Mean control Effect t-stat Pairs 
- 3 0.377 0.349 0.028 0.424 106 
- 2 0.312 0.347 -0.035 -0.619 144 
- 1 0.194 0.246 -0.052 -1.230 179 
+ 2 0.441 0.412 0.028 0.587 211 
+ 3 0.597 0.435 0.161 3.119 186 
+ 4 0.603 0.481 0.122 1.976 131 









Outcome 5 – Probability of being employed under an FTC 1996-2001  
Outcome variable 5, i.e. the probability of holding an FTC, is the counterpart to outcome 
variable 1.50 The matching procedure is able to balance out pre-treatment differences in the 
outcome variable to a large extent (see Table 9). It can be seen that entering into an FTC not 
only increases the probability of holding a permanent contract in the future but also to hold 
again an FTC.  
Note that in the third and fourth year after the treatment the effect on the probability of 
holding a permanent contract (Table 7) is higher than the probability of holding an FTC 
(Table 9). The sum of the two effects (probability of holding an FTC and probability of hold-
ing a permanent contract) corresponds approximately to the overall employment effect (see 
Figure 2).  
Table 9: Probability of being employed under an FTC – DEF.2   
 All Persons 
Year  Mean treated Mean control Effect t-stat Pairs 
- 3 0.104 0.075 0.028 0.715 106 
- 2 0.118 0.083 0.035 0.969 144 
- 1 0.136 0.115 0.021 0.614 191 
+ 2 0.313 0.142 0.171 4.239 211 
+ 3 0.134 0.097 0.037 1.123 186 
+ 4 0.137 0.061 0.076 2.060 131 
Notes: = 0.03. Ψ
6.3 Heterogeneous Effects 
Although it is not necessary for the application of matching estimators to assume the TT of 
the transition to FTCs to be the same for all individuals, so far only mean effects of all indi-
viduals have been presented. It is, however, reasonable to suppose that the individual effects 
are heterogeneous across individuals.  
Therefore, sub-samples are selected in advance and the estimation steps described above 
are performed on these samples. For many sup-samples, this approach turned out to be not 
suitable since the number of non-treated individuals per month became too small. Thus only 
a differentiation by a single characteristic is possible, i.e. the effects for women, individuals 
with formal qualification and individuals who are at least 32 years old, are estimated. Fur-
thermore, only non-treated DEF.2 is used in order to maximise the number of non-treated 
individuals, which may be justified by the fact that there have not been great differences in 
the effects between the two definitions of non-treatment. Nevertheless, the number of pairs 
becomes quite small, as many treated persons have to be dropped since no suitable non-
treated could be found within the support and the caliper. For this reason, the results should 
be interpreted with greatest caution and only as a “tendency”.  
                                              
50  Remember that the outcome variable 5 is only defined for non-treated DEF.2 (see section 4). 
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Women 
It can be seen in Figure 7 that the pre-treatment employment probability of those women 
entering into FTCs is always between 2 and 10 percentage points higher, which is, however, 
not statistically significant. Nevertheless, one can conclude that treated women (workers 
entering into FTCs) have ‘unobservable’ characteristics51 which lead to on average slightly 
higher employment probabilities. Keeping this caveat in mind and comparing Figure 7 with 
Figure 2 one may conclude that the employment effects are higher for women than for men. 
Whether the same can be stated about the unemployment effects (Figure 8) is unclear.    
A matter of particular interest are the effects on the probability of being-out-of-labour-
force. Comparing Figure 9 with Figure 6 and taking only the point estimates into account, 
one may conclude that the negative effect is at least temporarily stronger for women. The 
same seems to be true for the probability of holding a permanent contract: While for the 
whole population the effect after three years is 16 percentage points (Table 8) the effect for 
women is approximately 22 percentage points (Table 10). 
 
Figure 7: Employment effects – women (DEF.2) 
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51  Unobservable characteristics refers to a potential violation of the CIA: There are omitted (unobserved) 
variables which influence the selection into the FTC and the outcome.  
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Figure 8: Unemployment effects – women (DEF.2) 
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Figure 9: Out-of-labour-force effect – women (DEF.2) 








-24 -21 -18 -15 -12 -9 -6 -3 0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30 33 36












Table 10: Probability of being employed under a permanent contract / FTC – DEF.2 
 Women 









Effect t-stat Pairs 
- 3 0.290 0.258 0.032 0.274 0.097 0.065 0.032 0.451 31 
- 2 0.266 0.267 0.000 0.000 0.200 0.067 0.133 1.859 45 
- 1 0.161 0.194 -0.032 -0.467 0.210 0.048 0.161 0.058 62 
+ 2 0.537 0.373 0.164 1.903 0.194 0.030 0.164 3.087 67 
+ 3 0.563 0.333 0.229 2.295 0.125 0.042 0.083 1.479 48 
+ 4 0.600 0.429 0.171 1.435 0.114 0.029 0.086 1.392 35 
Notes:  = 0.03. Ψ
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Age 32 ≥
It would be interesting to evaluate the effects of entering into an FTC on the employment 
situation of workers older than 58 years since they can be hired according to legal regulation 
without justification on FTCs. Unfortunately, there are not enough observations available 
since the mean age of unemployed entering into FTCs is about 32 years. Therefore, only 
workers who are at least 32 years old are used in the analysis. The results in comparison to 
the whole sample can be summarised as follows.  
The employment effects seem to be similar to the effects for the whole sample (Figure 10 
and Figure 2), even though the positive effects are often not significant which may be ex-
plained by the small sample size. Also the effects on the probability of being unemployed 
(Figure 11 and Figure 4) and the probability of being out-of-labour force are very similar 
(Figure 12 and Figure 6),  whereas, again, the effects for the sub-sample are not statistically 
significant. There are some differences with respect to the effects on the probability of hold-
ing permanent contracts (Table 11 and Table 7) as well as probability of holding FTCs 
(Table 12 and Table 9). It seems, however, not to be possible to derive any clear-cut conclu-
sion from this comparison. 
Figure 10: Employment effects – age 32  (DEF.2) ≥
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Figure 11: Unemployment effects – age ≥32 (DEF.2) 








-24 -21 -18 -15 -12 -9 -6 -3 0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30 33 36












Figure 12: Out-of-labour-force effects – age 32 (DEF.2) ≥
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Table 11: Probability of being employed under a permanent contract / FTC – DEF.2  
 Age ≥ 32 
 Permanent contract FTC  








Effect t-stat Pairs 
- 3 0.551 0.367 0.184 1.837 0.082 0.082 0.000 0.000 49 
- 2 0.452 0.339 0.113 1.284 0.081 0.065 0.016 0.343 62 
- 1 0.238 0.250 -0.013 -0.183 0.075 0.05 0.025 0.650 80 
+ 2 0.533 0.373 0.160 1.981 0.147 0.067 0.080 1.589 75 
+ 3 0.517 0.466 0.052 0.553 0.138 0.052 0.086 1.588 58 
+ 4 0.541 0.405 0.135 1.159 0.108 0.054 0.054 0.844 37 
Notes:  = 0.03. Ψ
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With formal qualification 
In this subsection only those individuals are analysed which have completed at least a voca-
tional training. This amounts to approximately 70% of all individuals entering into FTCs. 
Obviously, due to the number of observations it is not possible to focus on the unemployed 
without formal qualification which would be more interesting from a policy-orientated point 
of view. Comparing again the point estimates of the monthly measured outcome variables 
(Figure 14 with Figure 3, Figure 15 with Figure 5, and Figure 15 with Figure 7) one may 
conclude that the effect for the sub-sample is slightly better in terms of enhancing employ-
ment prospects. The conclusions from a comparison with respect to the type of contract are 
again unclear (see Table 12).  
Figure 13: Employment effects – with formal qualification (DEF.2) 
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Figure 15: Out-of-labour-force effects – with formal qualification (DEF.2) 
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Table 12: Probability of being employed under a permanent contract / FTC – DEF.2   
 At least vocational training 









Effect t-stat Pairs 
- 3 0.400 0.400 0.000 0.000 0.100 0.100 0.000 0.000 40 
- 2 0.328 0.466 -0.138 -1.520 0.086 0.052 0.034 0.728 58 
- 1 0.203 0.278 -0.076 -1.098 0.114 0.114 0.000 0.000 79 
+ 2 0.599 0.401 0.198 3.624 0.138 0.060 0.078 2.363 167 
+ 3 0.585 0.492 0.093 1.424 0.136 0.059 0.076 1.967 118 
+ 4 0.533 0.453 0.080 0.976 0.147 0.004 0.106 2.268 75 





This paper has investigated the effects of the transition from unemployment to fixed-term 
contract (FTC) jobs on the individuals’ future employment opportunities in the West German 
labour market. First, it has been discussed that there are at least two reasonable counterfactu-
als for individuals entering into FTC jobs after a certain unemployment duration. One coun-
terfactual most commonly applied in evaluation studies is to compare a ‘world with FTCs’ 
with a ‘world without FTCs’ and define non-treated persons as unemployed who never (dur-
ing the period covered by the data set) enter into FTCs. A second counterfactual which may 
be more in line with the idea of sequential job search (unemployed enter into FTCs after hav-
ing failed to find a permanent job) is not to enter into an FTC up to a certain duration of un-
employment, but possibly in a later month. This implies a comparison of unemployed enter-
ing into FTCs in a particular month of unemployment duration with those unemployed who 
do not enter into FTCs up to the end of this month. Both definitions have been analysed in 
the paper. Contrary to expectation, the estimation results differ only slightly which may, 
however, be driven by the small sample size. Second, it has been shown that the estimation 
of the propensity score by a hazard rate model is a suitable approach to address various prac-
tical problems since it is able to balance pre-treatment differences between treated and non-
treated individuals in most cases and seems to be again more in line with sequential job 
search than the more common ‘static’ propensity score estimation.   
 
The empirical findings can be summarised as follows. First of all, it should be kept in 
mind, that the results may be biased due to the design of the estimation sample which is 
caused by the way the information on the type of contract is collected in the GSOEP. Short 
FTC employment spells are likely to be underrepresented. While NN-matching is robust 
against the general case that treated units are over- or underrepresented with regard to the 
underlying population (choice-based sampling), the results may still be biased by the selec-
tivity with regard to the duration of the employment spells.  
The competing risk hazard rate model shows that typical characteristics which have been 
found in other studies to prolong unemployment duration such as disabilities, being a for-
eigner, being female and having children do not affect the FTC hazard rate, but have a nega-
tive effect on the permanent contract hazard. Thus FTCs may be “entry jobs” for unem-
ployed with low employment chances.  
Entering into FTCs increases the future employment probability (including FTC and per-
manent contract jobs) and the probability of holding permanent contract jobs and decreases 
the probability of being out-of-labour-force. These findings are compatible with the hypothe-
sis that FTC may be stepping-stones towards permanent contract jobs.  
Some results of the hazard rate model and the matching approach are in line with dual la-
bour market theories: Having held an FTC increases the probability of entering into an FTC 
and holding an FTC in the future. Entering into an FTC has no long-term negative effect on 
the unemployment probability, i.e. the effect vanishes after 18 months.  
 45
Some more detailed analyses with regard to the heterogeneity of the effects revealed that 
unemployed women may benefit more from entering into FTCs than unemployed men. 
Slightly more positive effects have also been found for unemployed with formal qualifica-
tion. These results should, however, be interpreted with caution since the samples for the 
analyses were quite small. More detailed analyses would be useful. To the best of my 
knowledge, there is, however, no larger panel data set for Germany available including in-
formation on the type of contract.   
 
When interpreting the results one should, furthermore, keep in mind that this is a micro-
econometric study assuming that there are neither general equilibrium effects nor indirect 
effects from unemployed entering into FTCs on individuals who do not do so (see 
HECKMAN, LALONDE and SMITH, 1999). If employers were not allowed to hire workers on 
FTCs they would possibly hire the identical workers on permanent contracts. This behaviour 
is called deadweight effects in the literature on the evaluation of active labour market policy. 
This type of deadweight effects cannot be taken into account by the microeconometric ap-
proach applied here. In almost the same manner it would be misleading to conclude that 
FTCs reduce unemployment duration from a macroeconomic point of view. It is also possi-
ble that the re-employment probabilities of unemployed are reduced, since unemployed have 
to compete with FTC workers on existing vacancies (see BOERI, 1999), a mechanism which 
could be termed (analogously to active labour market programmes) substitution effect.  
Thus, besides more detailed microeconometric research, studies based on aggregate data or 
general equilibrium models would be useful to gain further insight into the labour market 
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Table A1: Duration of continuous employment spells after the transition from unemploy-
ment to FTCs and permanent contracts 
Employment spell 
starts with 






FTC 9.488     1 89 9.632 5 7 11 
Permanent contract 18.141     1 107 19.733 5 10 23 
Notes: The employment spells may include FTC and permanent contracts at different employers. 
The figures are based on the estimation sample of the duration models in Section 5. Right-censored 
employment spells are included which may bias the results. 
Table A2: Duration of unemployment by kind of transition 
Unemployment spell 
ends in  






FTC 8.766 1 79 9.078     3 6 11 
Permanent contract 8.087 1 79 7.891 3 6 10 
Training  8.936 1 60 9.027 3 6 11 
Out-of-labour-force 12.589 1 85 12.486 4 9 15 
Notes:  The figures are based on the estimation sample of the duration models in Section 5. 
 















Baseline hazard      
   Month  2 – 3 0.235 0.224 0.260 0.191 0.142 
   Month  4 – 6 0.115 0.198 0.196 0.221 0.176 
   Month  7 – 9 0.090 0.099 0.134 0.157 0.131 
   Month 10 – 12 0.038 0.093 0.081 0.089 0.144 
   Month 13 – 18  0.051 0.074 0.094 0.072  0.119 
   Month 19 ≥ 0.056 0.105 0.066  0.094 0.174 










No occupational qualification 0.338 0.300 0.290 0.332 0.429 
Master craftsman 0.047 0.040 0.065 0.064 0.018 
University graduate 0.073 0.164 0.105 0.089 0.049 
Female 0.397 0.456 0.437 0.498 0.621 
Disabled 0.038 0.088 0.051 0.119 0.139 




















Married 0.620 0.504 0.528 0.426  0.600 
Married x female 0.261 0.204 0.224 0.238  0.439 
No partner  0.316 0.408 0.360 0.519  0.322 
No partner x female 0.111 0.210 0.160 0.247 0.132 
Children < 16 0.551 0.453 0.403 0.353 0.430 
Children x female 0.244 0.218 0.152  0.213 0.327 
Prev job: end of FTC or apprenticeship 0.103 0.242 0.142 0.136 0.112 
Prev job: end of FTC or apprenticeship 
x female 
0.073 0.097 0.068 0.068 0.054 
Prev Job: dismissed 0.256 0.245 0.366 0.255  0.159 
Prev Job: dismissed x female 0.077 0.103 0.136 0.123 0.104 
Out-of-labour-force before  0.043 0.127 0.087 0.140 0.300 
Out-of-labour-force before x female 0.030 0.071 0.049 0.098 0.219 
Training or school before 0.081 0.190 0.170 0.302  0.161 










Prev. employment spell 3-5 months 0.056 0.085 0.064 0.051 0.062 
Prev. employment spell 6-8 months 0.103 0.085 0.049 0.034 0.060 
Prev. employment spell 9-11 months 0.137 0.045 0.068 0.055 0.022 
Prev. employment spell 12-20 months 0.081 0.065 0.077 0.055 0.033 
Prev. employment spell > 20 months 0.218 0.181 0.237 0.149 0.129 
Already ever an FTC before 0.150 0.269 0.151 0.115 0.102 
Public sector before 0.085 0.204 0.108 0.089 0.118 




















No unemployment benefit 0.449 0.473 0.445 0.468 0.628 
No unemployment assistance 0.910 0.884 0.925 0.898 0.930 










Spell started in first quarter 0.269 0.261 0.263 0.260 0.397 
Spell started in second quarter 0.217 0.215 0.261  0.187  0.240 
Spell started in third quarter 0.215 0.241 0.242 0.370 0.191 
Number of transitions 234 349 767 235 597 
Number of persons  219 321 683 214 533 
Notes: The figures are based on the estimation sample of the duration models in Section 5. Standard 
deviations of metric variables are in parentheses.   
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Table A4: Estimation Results of the multinomial logistic duration model 
 Exit into 
FTC 
Exit into       
PERM 





 Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat.
Baseline hazard         
   Month  2 – 3  0.573  3.39  0.958  8.04  0.603  2.74   0.600  3.60
   Month  4 – 6  0.527  3.01  0.782  6.15  0.790  3.66   0.780  4.85
   Month  7 – 9  0.355  1.65  0.893  6.29  0.964  4.05   0.875  5.05
   Month 10 – 12  0.869  3.88   0.922  5.51  0.916  3.25   1.453  8.38
   Month 13 – 18   0.593  2.43  1.059  6.57  0.613  2.01   1.211  6.65
   Month ≥ 19  0.835  3.50  0.770  4.08  0.808  2.67   1.320  7.36
Age   -0.160 -0.76 -0.156 -1.09 -0.423 -1.73  -0.101 -0.70
Age2 / 1.000  0.639  1.10  0.602  1.55  1.403  2.04   0.067  0.17
Age3 / 100.000  -0.083 -1.60 -0.076 -2.23 -0.151 -2.45   0.005  0.14
No occupational qualification  -0.399 -2.96 -0.444 -4.73 -0.362 -2.21  -0.148 -1.55
Master craftsman  -0.168 -0.58  0.147  0.90  0.228  0.79  -0.863 -2.76
University graduate  0.474  2.61  0.263  1.89  0.155  0.60  -0.246 -1.18
Female -0.017 -0.06  0.119  0.54 -0.651 -1.61   0.345  1.24
Disabled  0.111  0.54 -0.584 -3.36  0.461  2.08   0.527  3.92
Foreigner  0.060  0.44   -0.364 -3.78 -0.696 -3.74  -0.320 -3.13
Married  0.226  0.94 -0.041 -0.25 -0.125 -0.43  -0.202 -0.92
Married x female -0.370 -1.13 -0.060 -0.27  0.386  0.95   0.371  1.33
No partner  -0.252 -1.10 -0.310 -1.96  0.024  0.09   0.058  0.24
No partner x female 0.532  1.65  0.310  1.38  0.816  2.09  -0.559 -1.94
Children < 16 -0.104 -0.56 -0.003 -0.02 -0.494 -2.02  -0.206 -1.23
Children x female  0.002  0.01 -0.616 -3.51  0.197  0.63   0.365  1.83
Prev job: end of FTC or apprenticeship  0.738  3.60  0.252  1.49  0.020  0.07   0.478  2.29
Prev job: end of FTC or appr. x female -0.535 -1.86 -0.213 -0.91 -0.194 -0.47  -0.626 -2.18
Prev Job: dismissed  0.252  1.31  0.638  5.41  0.049  0.21  -0.430 -2.10
Prev Job: dismissed x female -0.053 -0.19 -0.279 -1.61  0.153  0.47   0.232  0.93
Out-of-labour-force before  0.536  1.93 -0.128 -0.59 -0.262 -0.70   0.400  2.02
Out-of-labour-force before x female -0.631 -1.82 -0.462 -1.67  0.033  0.08  -0.281 -1.29









… Table A4 continued 
 Exit into 
FTC 
Exit into       
PERM 





 Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat.
Duration of prev. unemployment spell  -0.018  -1.68  -0.010 -1.46 -0.020 -1.57  -0.015 -2.41
Prev. employment spell 3-5 months  0.805  3.43  0.399  2.27  0.131  0.39   0.518  2.54
Prev. employment spell 6-8 months  0.595  2.53 -0.099 -0.51  -0.363 -0.91   0.598  2.91
Prev. employment spell 9-11 months  0.320  1.09  0.781  4.44  0.585  1.78   0.128  0.42
Prev. employment spell 12-20 months  0.267  1.05  0.401  2.43  0.084  0.25   0.078  0.30
Prev. employment spell > 20 months   0.229  1.30  0.368  3.35 -0.018 -0.08   0.027  0.18
Already ever an FTC before  0.405  2.69 -0.159 -1.34  -0.333 -1.44  -0.039 -0.25
Public sector before  0.363  2.25 -0.071 -0.53 -0.397 -1.57  -0.109 -0.77
Numb. of prev. unemployment spells -0.066 -0.78 -0.016 -0.28  0.216  1.58   0.090  1.02
Numb. of prev. unemployment spells2  0.020  1.90   0.016  2.20 -0.028 -1.09  -0.009 -0.56
Log net household income -0.058 -2.65 -0.022 -1.38  0.050  1.40   0.046  2.01
No unemployment benefit  0.328  2.62    0.482  5.59  0.209  1.35   0.946  9.52
No unemployment assistance  0.997  5.19  1.293  8.40  1.065  4.33   1.842 10.49
Log regional unemployment rate  -0.068 -0.28 -0.604 -3.65 -0.044 -0.15  -0.104 -0.56
Spell started in first quarter -0.682 -4.46 -0.514 -4.69 -0.318 -1.57  -0.172 -1.36
Spell started in second quarter -0.625 -3.88 -0.418 -3.77 -0.378 -1.75  -0.253 -1.87
Spell started in third quarter -0.356 -2.27 -0.155 -1.39  0.512  2.69  -0.169 -1.20
1992  0.065  0.13  0.168  0.65  0.369  0.75   0.398  0.99
1993  -0.002 -0.00 -0.186 -0.72 -0.978 -1.76   0.680  1.75
1994  0.428  0.94  0.041  0.16 -0.031 -0.06   0.301  0.76
1995  0.266  0.58 -0.006 -0.02  0.140  0.29   0.408  1.04
1996  0.231  0.50 -0.207 -0.78 -0.230 -0.47   0.053  0.13
1997  0.226  0.48  0.121  0.45  0.031  0.06   0.379  0.94
1998  0.789  1.71    0.043  0.16  0.117  0.24   0.522  1.30
1999  0.706  1.51  0.471  1.79  0.582  1.20   0.838  2.11
2000  1.342  2.93  1.152  4.56  1.366  2.93   1.381  3.49
Constant  -3.719 -1.45 -1.874 -1.07 -1.501 -0.50 -4.663 -2.55
Numb. of Spells 349 767  235 597
Numb. of Persons 321 683  214 533
Numb. of Observations 23,151 
Log-likelihood -8166.4056 






 Table A5: Logistic hazard rate model (propensity score estimation) 
 Exit into FTC 
 Coef. t-stat. 
Baseline hazard   
   Month  2 – 3 0.475 2.82 
   Month  4 – 6 0.429 2.46 
   Month  7 – 9 0.231 1.08 
   Month 10 – 12 0.710 3.20 
   Month 13 – 18  0.420 1.74 
   Month 19 ≥ 0.691 3.00 
Age   -0.188 -0.92 
Age2 / 1.000 0.730 1.29 
Age3 / 100.000  -0.090 -1.80 
No occupational qualification -0.329 -2.51 
Master craftsman -0.165 -0.58 
University graduate 0.460 2.59 
Female 0.294 1.61 
Married 0.327 2.01 
Married x female -0.698 -3.06 
Prev job: end of FTC or Apprenticeship 0.554 2.97 
Prev job: end of FTC or Apprenticeship x female -0.457 -1.69 
Out-of-labour-force before 0.612 2.28 
Out-of-labour-force before x female -0.725 -2.16 
Training or school before 0.445 2.38 
Duration of prev. unemployment spell -0.016 -1.54 
Prev. employment spell 3-5 months 0.763 3.31 
Prev. employment spell 6-8 months 0.596 2.56 
Prev. employment spell 9-11 months 0.300 1.03 
Prev. employment spell 12-20 months 0.291 1.16 
Prev. employment spell > 20 months 0.247 1.41 
Already ever an FTC before 0.495 3.38 
Public sector before 0.393 2.48 
Numb. of prev. unemployment spells -0.048 -0.59 
Numb. of prev. unemployment spells2 0.015 1.48 
Log net household income -0.058 -2.71 
No unemployment benefit 0.281 2.31 





… Table A5 continued 
 Coef. t-stat. 
Log regional unemployment rate  0.117 0.57 
Spell started in first quarter -0.684 -4.48 
Spell started in second quarter -0.645 -4.01 
Spell started in third quarter -0.402 -2.58 
Constant  -3.523 -1.46 
Numb. of Spells 349 
Numb. of Persons 321 
Numb. of Observations (person month) 23,151 
Log-likelihood -1645.004 
χ2 (37) 330.62 
 
Table A6: Implementation of the propensity score matching estimator 
1. Estimate a discrete (logistic) hazard rate model for the transition from unemployment in FTC 
(independent competing risk). Include all covariates X and a non-parametric (piece-wise con-
stant) specification for the base-line hazard  
 
2. Predict the propensity score ( )(Pr , 1 ,ke T t C X t T≡ = = ≥ )k t  for every individual i (with T = 
duration of the unemployment spell and k=number of unemployment spells)  
 
3. For non-treatment DEF.1: Exclude individuals who are treated at any time during the period 
from the pool of ‘non-treated’ persons 
 
4. Impose common support condition for every month: Drop observations outside the support 
and the caliper 
 
5. NN-Matching: For every calendar month τ  to each treated person the non-treated person 
with the closest propensity score e two months before the actual transition to FTC occurs is 
matched (with replacement). Kernel-Based Matching: For every calendar month τ to each 
treated person all non-treated person two months before the actual transition to FTC occurs 
are matched. Assign to every matched non-treated person a weight which depends on the 
distance between the propensity scores e.  
 
6. The effect is the difference in the (weighted) mean outcomes of the two groups 
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